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Abstract Each year, crowd disasters happen in different areas of the world.
How and why do such disasters happen? Are the fatalities caused by relent-
less behavior of people or a psychological state of panic that makes the crowd
‘go mad’? Or are they a tragic consequence of a breakdown of coordination?
These and other questions are addressed, based on a qualitative analysis of
publicly available videos and materials, which document the planning and or-
ganization of the Love Parade in Duisburg, Germany, and the crowd disaster
on July 24, 2010. Our analysis reveals a number of misunderstandings that
have widely spread. We also provide a new perspective on concepts such as
‘intentional pushing’, ‘mass panic’, ‘stampede’, and ‘crowd crushs’. The focus
of our analysis is on the contributing causal factors and their mutual inter-
dependencies, not on legal issues or the judgment of personal or institutional
responsibilities. Video recordings show that people stumbled and piled up due
to a ‘domino effect’, resulting from a phenomenon called ‘crowd turbulence’
or ‘crowd quake’. This was the consequence of amplifying feedback and cas-
cading effects, which are typical for systemic instabilities. Hence, things can
go terribly wrong in spite of no bad intentions from anyone. Comparing the
incident in Duisburg with others, we give recommendations to help prevent
future crowd disasters. In particular, we introduce a new scale to assess the
criticality of conditions in the crowd. This may allow preventative measures
to be taken earlier on. Furthermore, we discuss the merits and limitations of
citizen science for public investigation, considering that today, almost every
event is recorded and reflected in the World Wide Web.
? The following complementary webpage with time-ordered, geo-located videos been set
up for this paper: http://loveparadevideos.heroku.com/
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1 Introduction
Crowd disasters are known since at least the Roman Empire. As a consequence,
building codes for stadia were developed. The Coliseum in Rome, Italy, which
is considered to be one of the seven world wonders, is probably the best known
example of Roman building experience. While it could take up between 50,000
and 73,000 visitors, it had 76 numbered entrances, and visitors exited through
the same gate through which they had entered. In fact, exits were located side
by side, around the entire circumference of the Coliseum. As a consequence,
the Coliseum could be evacuated within just 5 minutes, an efficiency that is
not even reached by modern stadia due to their smaller number of exits.
Building codes and regulations for mass events have also been written and
updated after recent crowd disasters, such as the ones in Bradford (1985) or
Hillsborough, Sheffield (1989) [1–8]. Today’s knowledge about the dynamics
of crowds is considerable and summarized in Refs. [9–15]. Furthermore, a lot
of experience in organizing safer mass events has recently been gained from
the organization of religious pilgrimage [16–20]. In recent years, there is also
a quickly growing body of literature on evacuation experiments [14, 15, 21–
28] and pedestrian simulations [12,26,29–40], and various related commercial
software products are now available. Thus, how was it possible that 21 people
died and more than 500 were injured during the Love Parade on July 24, 2010?
A crucial point for the safety of mass events is that they are (or at least
should be) organized in a way that is robust against many kinds of disturbances
(such as weather conditions, human errors, etc.). This is why the organization
of a mass event includes the elaboration of contingency plans. Why then can
crowd disasters still happen?
This paper will reveal that the Love Parade disaster was not the result of
a single mistake. We will rather show that the Love Parade disaster resulted
from the interaction of several contributing factors. It is probably the first time
that a detailed analysis can be performed with publicly available documents:
not just investigation reports by public authorities [41,42] and the media, but
also maps from Google Earth [43] and 360 degree photographs [44], videos ac-
cessible through YouTube [45], documents released by Wikipedia [46–48] and
Wikileaks [49], and other sources. In some sense, this opens up a new age of
public investigation. However, to avoid misunderstandings, we would like to
underline that our analysis focuses on the course of events and causal inter-
dependencies among them, while they do not draw any conclusions regarding
legal issues or personal or institutional responsibilities, which must be judged
by other experts (see, for example, Ref. [50]).
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows: Section 2 provides
an overview of the situation before and during the Love Parade disaster. This
includes a historical background, a description of the festival area (including
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in- and outflows), and a timeline reconstructed from many video recordings.
Section 3 will analyze various factors contributing to the disaster, while Sec-
tion 4 will focus on causal interdependencies and interaction effects. Section
5 discusses our findings and Section 6 concludes with lessons learned for the
organization of future mass events. The novelty of this paper is four-fold: it con-
cerns (1) the structured analysis of large amounts of publicly available video
recordings of a disaster, (2) the interpretation of the disaster as a systemic
failure (where the interaction of various factors created a systemic instability,
causing an overall loss of control), (3) a revision of common views about crowd
disasters, and (4) the introduction of a scale reflecting the criticality of crowd
conditions (and proposed counter-measures).
2 Overview of the Situation
The following section will try to give a short overview of the situation during
the Love Parade in Duisburg and the planning beforehand. A large number of
documents are now publicly available (see Ref. [51] for a collection of links).
This includes the planning documents [49], the event log of the regulatory au-
thority of the city of Duisburg [52], and the evacuation analysis [53]. Publicly
accessible materials and eye witness reports now amount to several hundred
pages [54] and more than 500 video recordings [55]. This useful collection of
materials is the result of the efforts of many volunteers. It is certainly not pos-
sible (but also not the purpose) of this article to give a complete representation
of materials. We will rather focus on the most relevant details in order to avoid
a distraction of the reader from the main factors that have contributed to the
disaster.
The interested reader is invited to gain a more complete picture himself or
herself, based on the media reports provided in Refs. [56–58] and documen-
taries of several TV channels [59–61]. The view of the organizer is presented
in Ref. [62]. Further video documentations are available from private per-
sons [63–66]. An interpretation of the events, overlayed to a satellite picture,
can be found in Ref. [67].
In order to make an independent assessment possible, our own analysis
will largely refer to authentic materials that are publicly accessible. Videos
of a subset of surveillance cameras are available until 16:40 [68]. Timelines
can be found in Refs. [41, 52, 69]. Complementary to this article, we provide
a time-ordered and geo-located collection of videos from visitors of the Love
Parade [70]. A YouTube channel with videos of the Love Parade exists as
well [45]. The collection [55] contains further videos. Many of these videos
have been synchronized [71, 72], and some of them have been cut together in
the form of multi-view videos documenting the course of events [73]. A set of
highly relevant private videos around the time of the disaster can be found in
Refs. [72, 74–83].
Note that, when referring to secondary sources (such as public media re-
ports), we will sometimes use wordings such as “apparently” or “seems to”,
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in order to indicate that access to primary sources would be desirable for an
in-depth analysis.
2.1 History of the Love Parade
The Love Parade is a popular electronic dance music festival in Germany that
was first organized in Berlin in 1989, and annually repeated in the same city
until 2003. The events in 2004 and 2005 had to be cancelled because of funding
problems and a coordinated opposition of political parties (e.g. related to the
waste resulting from the event) [46]. In 2006, the parade made a comeback
with the support of a fitness studio. The Love Parade in summer 2007 was
again planned for Berlin, but the event was cancelled, since the Senate of
Berlin did not issue the necessary permits on time. After negotiations with
several German cities, it was then decided to move the Love Parade to the
Ruhr Area, an agglomerate of major German cities, in the next years. The
first of these events took place in Essen on August 25, 2007, with 1.2 million
visitors. In July 2008, it was organized in Dortmund. The 2009 event, planned
for Bochum, was cancelled due to security concerns, particularly as a critical
situation had apparently occurred the year before [47]. The last Love Parade
took place on July 24, 2010, in Duisburg, where 21 people died and more
than 500 were injured in a crowd disaster. The chain of events underlying this
disaster will be analyzed in the following sections.
2.2 Description of the Festival Area
The festival area of the Love Parade in 2010 was approximately 100,000 square
meters large [56] and located in the area of a previous freight station of the city
of Duisburg. For a 360 degree view of the festival area and its surroundings see
Ref. [44]. In contrast to the open area concept of the Love Parade in Berlin (see
the picture in Ref. [84]), the annual Carnival in Cologne, and the 20th World
Youth Day gathering with the Catholic Pope in 2005 in Cologne-Marienfeld,
Germany [85], the festival area was constrained by railway tracks on the East
and by a freeway on the West. In response to concerns from the regulatory
authority that the area would be too small for the expected number of up
to 1.4 million expected visitors [56], the city of Duisburg combined its late
approval of the event with the condition to restrict the number of concurrent
visitors to 250,000.
To overcome security issues seen by the regulatory authority (there was
some discussion to cancel the event overall), the organizer of the Love Parade
decided to fence the whole festival area. This moved the responsibility to the
building regulatory agency [56] and required the event to satisfy the “Ver-
sammlungssta¨ttenverordnung” [8], which is the German safety regulation for
the organization of mass events. However, there were still concerns that the
standard safety requirements would not be met. It is conceivable that these
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concerns were not fully considered due to a desire to approve the event [86],
particularly as Duisburg was nominated as Germany’s ‘cultural capital’ of the
year, and the opinion prevailed that the Love Parade would make the cultural
program and the city more attractive [56]. To overcome the concerns, an ex-
pert opinion was requested from a prominent crowd researcher. The report
argued that the festival area could be sufficiently well evacuated in an emer-
gency situation [53]. However, the study did not analyze normal entry and exit
conditions in detail.
Figure 1 gives an overview of the festival area. It shows that the festival
area could be entered only via a tunnel, “Karl-Lehr-Straße”, which also served
as the only exit from the area. In the middle of that tunnel, there is the
main ramp that leads to the festival area. The tunnel and the ramp together
determine an inverse T-shaped geometry of in- and outflows. A side ramp in
the West (“Am Gu¨terbahnhof”) was assigned as an additional exit ramp [41],
but basically not used. The smallest overall diameter of the tunnels in the East
and in the West was about 20 meters [48]. The ramp itself was 26 meters wide
and 130 meters long [56]. Based on the maximum flow value of 1.225 persons
per meter per second [87], this would imply a hypothetical maximum flow of
114,660 persons per hour and a density of 1.75 persons per square meter, if the
entire ramp width was usable. However, the actual capacity was significantly
lower than this due to the following factors (see also Sec. 2.3):
1. The maximum possible flow is inconvenient and potentially unsafe, and
therefore not suited as a basis for planning [9, 88–90].
2. Counterflows are expected to reduce the capacity by 6−14% [87], resulting
in a maximum hypothetical flow of 98,608 persons per hour.
3. The 90 degree turn to and from the tunnels is expected to reduce the
capacity as well.
4. Walking in groups reduces the capacity further [91].
5. Alcohol and drugs are expected to have a negative impact on capacity as
well.
6. A considerable amount of capacity must have been lost due to fences [92],
a food stand [93], and vehicles on the side of the ramp [94].
The flow model of the organizer assumed the following numbers [95]:
According to Table 1, between 17:00 and 18:00 the organizers expected
an inflow of 90,000 and an outflow of 55,000 people, which could not have
been handled by the wide ramp without the use of suitable crowd control.
Problems had to be expected already for much smaller flow rates, as there
were vehicles and a food stand as well as fences on the ramp, which must have
reduced its capacity considerably. This risk factor certainly had to be carefully
considered by the crowd management concept. In fact, the side ramp (see Fig.
1) was attributed as an additional exit ramp, and the organizational concept
foresaw the possibility to reduce the visitor flows through ‘isolating devices’
(access control points), which were located in front of the tunnel entrances [98].
Despite this, access control was given up intermittently because of the large
pressure from incoming visitors (see Ref. [41] and Tables 2 to 4). The festival
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police cordon 1a
(15:50 - 16:02)
police cordon 2 
(15:57 - 16:13)
police cordon 1b
(16:02 - 16:20)
police cordon 3
(16:02/16:12 - 16:28)
police cordon 4
(16:31 - 16:37)
Karl-Lehr-Str.
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(freight station)
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(16:47 ~ 17:00)
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triangular fences
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toilets
(pole)
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manhole
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food stand
(pole)
K12
K13 K16
K15
K14
K5
K4
Fig. 1 Illustration of the festival area and the ways to and from the area. Camera positions
are shown as well as locations and events that are relevant for the analysis of this study.
Note that the indicated timing of the police cordons (as reconstructed from video recordings)
slightly differs from the police report [41], but the differences are small.
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Time Expected inflow/h Expected outflow/h
14:00-15:00 55,000 10,000
15:00-16:00 55,000 50,000
16:00-17:00 55,000 45,000
17:00-18:00 90,000 55,000
Table 1 Expected inflows and outflows estimated by the organizers (see Ref. [95] for more
details). Based on these values, the maximum number of visitors on the festival area was
expected to be 235,000 (while a capacity of 250,000 was approved and more than 1 mil-
lion visitors were expected, according to announcements before and during the event [96]).
Estimates based on surveillance videos of camera 13 suggest that the actual flows were con-
siderably below the values in the above table. According to Ref. [97], the inflow in the time
period between 14:00 and 15:00 varied between 280 and 600 persons per minute and the out-
flow between 6 and 80 persons per minute. Between 15:00 and 15:40, it varied between 450
and 750 persons per minute and the outflow between 40 and 250 persons per minute. This
is 30-50% below expectations of the organizer of the Love Parade and implies a maximum
number of visitors on the festival area of about 175,000.
area itself was apparently not overcrowded (see caption of Table 1 and aerial
photographs [99,100]). So, why and how did the crowd disaster happen in the
inverse T-section formed by the tunnel and the ramp, even though the visitor
flows were apparently smaller than expected (see Table 1) and a more than
3,000 people strong police force was on duty? To address this question, we will
first present an expert opinion on the crowd disaster. Then, we will summarize
the course of events, and analyze the contributing factors in more detail.
2.3 Expert Report by Prof. Dr. G. Keith Still
An expert report dated December 9, 2011, which became public in February
2012 [101], analyzes the implications of the flow model presented in Table 1.
In the following, we summarize the essence of this report in our own words:
1. Safe crowd conditions can be usually assumed for densities up to 2-3 per-
sons per meter and minute and a maximum acceptable flow of 82 persons
per meter and minute (which is considerably below the maximum possible
flow) [102].
2. All areas, in which higher crowd densities may occur or where many people
may accumulate, must be analyzed for risks.
3. The safety concept must list those risks and also, who is responsible to
handle them. The organizational structure (in particular, who takes what
kinds of decisions) must be fixed before the event. Particular attention
must be paid to crowd management and communication (loud speakers,
signs, maps and other plans).
4. All authorities involved in the organization of the event are responsible for
the safety of the crowd. The division of responsibility should be regulated
in the concept of the event. A mass event should not be approved, if it
does not satisfy the applicable safety regulations.
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5. The reason for most crowd disasters in the past was a failure to regulate
the flow of people in high throughput areas.
6. The organization of an event needs plans for normal operation, but also
contingency plans for all kinds of incidents.
7. There are basically three ways of influencing the safety of crowds: design,
information, and crowd management.
8. At the Love Parade in Duisburg, the capacity of the main ramp to and
from the festival area was given by the minimum usable width of the ramp.
Due to two triangular fence structures [92,103], which were apparently not
shown in the maps, the effective width of the ramp was only 10.59 meters.
According to the expert report, this implies a maximum safe flow of 10.59
meters × 82 persons per meter and minute × 60 minutes = 52,103 persons
per hour. However, the maximum expected flow between 17:00 and 18:00
was 145,000 persons per hour, which would require a width of 29.5 meters.
Therefore, at the Love Parade in Duisburg, problems with the in- and
outflows and a critical accumulation of people had to be expected.
9. Once the crowd density exceeds between 4 or 5 persons per square meter,
congestion can build up quickly, which implies high risks for people to
stumble or fall (particularly if the ground is uneven). Therefore, injuries
can easily happen.
10. People in a dense crowd cannot see what happens a few meters away from
them, and they are not aware of the pressure in front.
11. The density, noise, and chaos in a dense crowd cause a natural desire to
leave the crowd. Due to a lack of suitable crowd control and guidance,
visitors of the Love Parade in Duisburg could only see a narrow staircase
as a possible emergency exit (see Fig. 1). When trying to get there, the
pressure towards the staircase increased and eventually triggered the crowd
disaster.
The analysis of the effective capacity of the main ramp suggests that prob-
lems on the ramp were foreseeable, and the question arises, why the obstacles
were placed there. However, a complete assessment should also consider the
existence of the side ramp (see Fig. 1). Moreover, due to the applied access
control, the flows on the main ramp did not reach the expected flows by far.
This can be directly concluded from the fact that there was never any signif-
icant congestion between the two triangular obstacles defining the narrowest
part of the ramp, before the flow was controlled in this area from 16:02 on;
this is clearly visible in the surveillance videos [103]. An active bottleneck, in
contrast, would be characterized by the formation of a queue [104].
Queues of people did not form in the middle of the ramp, but rather at
the upper end, where visitors were trying to enter the festival area. This, how-
ever, is not the location where the crowd disaster happened. Therefore, while
one had to expect problems in the middle of the ramp where the triangular
obstacles were located, the crowd disaster was actually not caused by those
obstacles. The course of events that resulted in the crowd disaster involved
many contributing factors, as we will show in the following. This conclusion of
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our study is in line with a quote referring to the Hillsborough disaster of 1989,
which apparently goes back to the Archbishop of York and can be found in
Keith Still’s PhD thesis [11]: “Events of the magnitude of Hillsborough don’t
usually happen just for one single reason, nor is it usually possible to pin the
blame on one single scapegoat... Disasters happen because a whole series of
mistakes, misjudgements and mischance happen to come together in a deadly
combinations.” This should be kept in mind when Keith Still’s expert report
on the crowd disaster in Duisburg points out that it is merely based on the
evidence presented to him and that it answers only the questions posed to
him.
2.4 Timeline
The chronology presented in Table 2 is an abbreviated version of the timeline
that was originally provided by the organizers of the Love Parade together with
their documentary movie [62]. It is largely supported by the surveillance videos
[68] and other public sources. Additional points will be discussed afterwards.
The video recordings of the surveillance cameras and the related chronol-
ogy, which were publicly provided by the organizer, end at 16:40 (“in respect
of the victims”). Tables 3 and 4 present additional information that is rele-
vant for a reconstruction of the causes of the crowd disaster. A time-ordered,
geo-coded video link collection supplementing this paper allows the readers to
gain an independent impression [70].
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12:02 The festival area is opened. Visitors can enter the area via the access control
points from East and West via the tunnel.
13:00 The inflow is reduced by closing 10 of 16 isolating devices, both on the East
and West entrance towards the tunnel.
13:45-14:15 No important disturbances or queues of visitor flows occur in the entry
area.
Around
14:00
Official start of the Love Parade.
14:15-14:30 The concentration of visitors increases at the end of the entrance ramp
towards the festival area (due to obstructions by ‘floats’, i.e. moving music
trucks).
14:30-15:15 The crowd manager tries to order support by the police. The organizer
states that the person responsible for connecting to the police (the ‘liaison
officer’) did not have a working walkie talkie or mobile phone.
14:30-15:06 The visitor flow on the ramp and from the West increases.
Around
15:00
Reduction of the visitor flow by closing as many isolating devices as possi-
ble.
15:12-15:34 Change of police shifts [105]. 5 police cars drive into the ramp area.
15:31 Visitors ignore the fence on the side of the main ramp, following police
forces, who have temporarily opened it. Shortly later, visitors overcome
fences also on the other side of the ramp, which should prevent them from
taking the steep slope up to the festival area.
15:50 A first chain of police forces (police cordon) is formed in front of the side
ramp, blocking in- and outflows in the West [106] (see cordon 1a in Fig. 1).
15:50-15:57 A second police cordon closes the tunnel to the East (see cordon 2 in Fig.
1).
Around
16:02
There is a sudden strong visitor flow towards the festival area from the
West. The first police cordon is moved behind the side ramp (see cordon
1b in Fig. 1).
From 16:02 Police forces start to control the flows to (and from) the festival area in the
middle of the ramp (where the ramp is narrowest due to some fences) [107].
Queues start to form on both sides of the resulting bottleneck [108].
Around
16:06
There are just a few visitors between the three police cordons.
Around
16:07
A jam of visitors forms in the West part of the tunnel.
Around
16:09
A jam of visitors forms above the chain of police forces on the ramp, when
trying to exit the festival area.
16:12-16:28 The third police cordon is completed (see cordon 3 in Fig. 1). It stops the
in- and outflows completely, where the fences narrow down the ramp.
Around
16:13
The small ramp is opened as entrance to the festival area. Visitors climb
over fences.
Around
16:14
The second police cordon in the East opens up, and visitors enter the area
of the big ramp from below [109].
Around
16:17
First visitors try to enter the festival area via a narrow staircase connecting
the lower part of the ramp with the festival area on top [110]. Afterwards,
the staircase is blocked by two security people [111].
Around
16:21
The first police cordon in the West dissolves [54,112]. The previously wait-
ing visitors move towards the ramp and encounter there the dense flow of
visitors coming from the East.
16:22 First people climb the pole [54,113].
16:22-16:24 The third police cordon still keeps the ramp closed, while the pressure
increases from both sides (i.e. inflow and outflow).
16:24-16:28 The third police cordon is dissolved [114].
Around
16:27
The narrow staircase is used by people to get up to the festival area [115].
Someone climbs on top of a traffic sign [116].
16:31-16:37 A fourth police cordon is formed in the upper area of the ramp [117]. At
the same time, the density in the lower area of the ramp increases steadily.
After 16:40 The situation gets out of control. More and more visitors try to get up to
the festival area via the small staircase, the pole and a container (used by
the crowd management, located at the lower end of the ramp in the South).
Table 2 Timeline according to the organizers of the Love Parade.
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8:03 The police receive an e-mail informing them about the official approval of
the Love Parade [54].
Until 12:00 The construction work (leveling work) of a bulldozer on the festival ground
takes longer than planned and delays the opening of the festival for approx-
imately one hour [56].
13:33 20,000 techno fans are waiting in the West and are creating a lot of pressure
to get in [56, 118].
13:44 The police are worried that the access point may be overrun [56].
Around
14:00
A police officer asks the crowd management to make a loudspeaker an-
nouncement, but this cannot be done, because there is no working loud-
speaker equipment despite requirements to have one [56].
After 14:03 Visitors are obstructed by floats (music trucks), while trying to enter the
festival area from the ramp [56,119].
14:42 The obstruction by the floats on the festival area causes a jam of arriving
visitors on the ramp almost up to the tunnel [56].
14:52 For some time, it is not possible to enter the festival area from the ramp [54].
15:06 The minister of interior visits the crisis management team [54].
15:30-18:00 Mobile phones do not work due to an overload of the mobile phone networks
[56].
From 15:31 Visitors start to climb the slope in the West of the main ramp and one
minute later in the East to get to the festival area [120].
Around
16:00
Turmoil and critical crowd conditions occur in front of the access points. A
policeman instructs the crowd management to open the access point in the
West [56]. The access point in the East is intermittently opened to reduce
the pressure in the crowd [56].
16:31 A fence at the West side of the tunnel is opened to allow an emergency
vehicle to enter. Hundreds of visitors make use of the occurring gap to
enter the tunnel [41].
Around
16:30
Visitors overcome fences in the tunnel [121].
16:35-16:43 People scream for help and shout at others they should hurry up; some seem
to panic, but others try to calm them down; the situation changes quickly:
people change between screaming and laughing; some people manage to
climb the staircase, but there is still no continuous flow of people on the
staircase [122]. People scream they are about to die [123]. The traffic sign
is already bent [124]. People shout from above that those on the narrow
staircase should move on [125].
Around
16:36
Crowd turbulence and critical situation around the pole [126].
Starting
16:38
Police are limiting the number of people on the staircase (usually 2 or 3 at
a time), but make sure that people do not stop on the staircase [127].
Around
16:40
An unconscious women is passed on to the narrow staircase and elevated
up [128]. A sparse, slowly moving crowd in the tunnel moves towards the
festival area [129].
Starting
approx.
16:40
Police cars in the city make loudspeaker announcements that the festival
area is completely full and will not be accessible to further visitors anymore
until the end of the day [130].
Around
16:44
Some people climb a pole and the narrow staircase next to the ramp (see
Fig. 1). Several people try to elevate themselves from the crowd by climbing
a billboard. Many seem to be in trouble between the staircase and the
tunnel [131].
16:47 Interview with the Love Parade organizer, who does not seem to be aware
how critical the situation is [96].
Around
16:48
A command is given to stop inflows to the tunnel and the ramp area com-
pletely. It is executed within minutes [56]. Sound of police sirens; some
people have fallen to the ground and raise their hands into the air for
help [132].
Around
16:50
An emergency vehicle is entering the ramp area through the tunnel and
opens its sliding door. An interaction between the crowd and people in
the emergency vehicle takes place. The trouble between the staircase and
tunnel is becoming more and more serious [133]. A video from the West
looking down on the crowd shows shockwaves in the crowd. Police forces
are having a hard time holding a fence back at the container, which is used
by the crowd management [134].
Table 3 Further relevant events.
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Starting
16:53
The emergency vehicle stops in the middle of the crowd. Strong shock waves
occur all over the crowd and push people to the ground between tunnel and
staircase [135]. Arms are lifted up and people are screaming. A group of
people is aggressively pushing their way towards the tunnel (see Ref. [135]
between minutes 1:28 and 1:35). Some people are crawling on top of others
to get towards the staircase. A helicopter flies overhead. Someone fixes a
rope above the tunnel to allow people to climb up [135,136].
16:54-17:03 Some people get pulled up to the narrow staircase. A ladder is lowered
down to the container at the South end of the ramp, and a woman, who
seems to be hurt, is lying down on the container [137,138].
Starting
16:57
People are pulled up one by one via the container [139]. People in the crowd
are being pushed around. A few people climb onto other people, trying to
get out of the crowd. A woman is screaming loudly [140].
Starting
16:58
The situation is extremely crowded. Some people scramble up the narrow
staircase. Many people yell for help [141].
Starting
16:59
More people are pulled up from the crowded container to the festival area
above. Security guards and police walk along the East side. A police officer
is filming [142]. An ambulance car is approaching on the freeway in the
West.
Starting
17:01
View of emergency forces near the staircase area [143].
Starting
17:02
People scramble up the stairs. Many people are yelling for help. The situ-
ation is extremely crowded. Police attempt to control the crowd [144].
17:02 First victims are reported on the ramp [41,54].
Starting
17:03
The stairs are clearing slightly, and some people are able to get up [145].
Starting
17:03
A man is trying to grab people and pull them up on the South over the
container. Police holds the fence back. An orange ladder is used to get
people out from the container [146].
Around
17:04
Seven policemen are talking to a few people. Two are helping someone on
the ground [147].
Starting
17:05
A view from the tunnel shows some people climbing up over the container,
also with the help of ropes. It seems that people in the tunnel behind are
still reasonably fine. Some of them appear to be dancing [148].
Starting
17:05
More people are able to get up via the staircase. The density in the ramp
area is reduced, and the police are turning around some people at the back
of the crowd, who are still trying to get to the stairs. [149].
Starting
17:05
A crowd of people has fallen in front of the stairs, raising their arms up.
Some rescue workers and festival attendees are pulling people out. One
policeman tries to hold back the crowd. An emergency vehicle is guided to
the ramp area by the police, coming from the East tunnel [150].
Starting
17:07
The stairs are still crowded. Someone is shouting for help by the police.
Some policemen on the stairs help people up [151].
Starting
17:08
Someone is yelling at the police [152]. People are pulled out of the fallen
crowd, and some receive first aid. The crowd below the staircase seems
“cleared” by the end of the video, and there is a considerable amount of
police and rescue forces [153].
Starting
17:08
People can be seen lying on top of each other. The situation is still crowded,
but the density eventually reduces [154].
Starting
17:09
The situation continues to be crowded, but people are starting to move more
smoothly up the stairs. The area around the fallen people empties [155].
17:15 The operation room of the city of Duisburg does not seem to be aware of
the critical situation. It still calls the Love Parade a big success [156].
Starting
17:16
The situation on the ramp has cleared up, but the group of fallen people
still seems to be without professional help. A rescue crew appears in the
South-West corner. A person is lying unconsciously on the ground. Many
people try to resuscitate others. Fallen visitors are pulled out of the pile of
people [157].
Around
17:20
The crowd has mostly dissolved. Fire and ambulance cars are parked in
the South of the ramp. A woman tries to provide first aid to a man in the
South-West corner. At least 2 other people provide first aid to people on
the ground [158].
Around
18:00
It is decided not to terminate the Love Parade to avoid further critical
situations (by evacuating the festival area too quickly) [41,54,159].
Table 4 Further relevant events (continued).
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An overview of the videos (as well as the locations and times when they
were taken) are provided on a supplementary webpage [70]. However, we would
like to point out that the times provided on the videos or in the respective
video portal may not always be exact. A synchronized video collection is now
also available [55].
3 Contributing Factors
After the occurrence of a disaster, it is natural to ask, who is responsible. In
many cases, people are trying to find one person or organization (the ‘scape-
goat’) to blame. In fact, after the Love Parade disaster, it seems that everybody
was blaming everybody else: the visitors, the organizers, the police, the city
of Duisburg. What makes things difficult is that nobody is totally right and
nobody is totally wrong: in the following, we will argue that it is the interac-
tion of many contributing factors that caused the crowd disaster. Before we
discuss the interaction of these factors, however, let us shed more light on some
of them in separation. While doing so, we will address a number of hypotheses
regarding the cause of the crowd disaster, which have been formulated after
the event. Given the many victims and pictures reminding of a war zone, some
people first thought that a terrorist attack with explosives had happened [160].
Others claimed that the fatalities resulted, because some people had fallen on
top of others when unsuccessfully trying to climb the stairs from the side or
the billboard [161] (see Fig. 1). And again others were blaming the crowd for
the outbreak of a ‘mass panic’ (stampede) [162] or at least some people for im-
proper behavior [163]. The first hypothesis was obviously not true. But what
about the others?
3.1 Did the crowd panic?
When talking about crowd disasters, public media often use the term ‘mass
panic’, which suggests the occurrence of a stampede as reason of the disaster
(see Ref. [164] and also the name of the link in Ref. [46]). This suggests that
crowd disasters happen, because the crowd ‘goes mad’ [165]. There certainly
exist some instances of this kind (such as the stampede in Baghdad on August
25, 2005, due to spreading rumors of an imminent suicide bombing in the
crowd [166], or the stampede in a Chicago night club triggered by rumors
of a poisonous gas attack [167]). However, the hypothesis of a “psychological
state of panic” as reason of crowd disasters has been questioned many times
[168,169].
What evidence do we have for the Love Parade disaster in Duisburg? Has
the crowd ‘gone mad’ because of influence of alcohol and drugs or because
of impatience to get on the festival area? At first sight, one may think so,
given that a number of visitors climbed over fences, up the pole, and on the
container to reach the festival area. However, as we will see, these activities
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started at a time when people on the ramp were already exposed to crowded
conditions.
Let us discuss this in more detail. The first problems with visitors over-
coming fences were reported around 15:31 [120]. However, there were reports
as early as 13:40 (see Table 3), which show that people waiting for access had
difficulties to breathe and asked to open the emergency exits (which did not
happen) [170]. These problems demonstrate that the access capacity was far
below demand.
Problems related to queues of people aggravate when queues are long and
broad, so that little or no progress is visible. In such situations, people will
subconsciously reduce their distance eventually. Although the reduction of dis-
tance might be negligible, the so-called ‘queuing effect’ will create the impres-
sion of progress. However, it will also cause a compression of the crowd [171].
When the distance is small, there will be inadvertent body contacts, which
can add up and cause unintentional pushing. Note that the transition from
an acceptable situation with rare body contacts to a stressful situation with
frequent contacts can happen quite abruptly [172]. People may interpret this
as intentional pushing, which may trigger stress and aggression. At a certain
density, it may also be required to push others away in order to be able to
breathe [170,173].
If people have to wait long and are not informed about the reasons for
this, they will become impatient and may eventually start to push intentionally
(because they assume that progress can be accelerated). While most impatient
pushing happens in the middle of the queue, the situation usually becomes
most critical at the front of the queue (but the people who push cannot see
this, and they experience much less crowded conditions).
The situation is particularly bad behind bottlenecks. These can create
‘traps’ without any possibility to escape. Such situations must generally be
avoided. This also means that flow control is not a solution for every problem.
It requires suitable designs and an adaptive operation.
According to our assessment, it had to be expected that the access points
would have to be opened and fences would eventually be overcome, given
that the festival area and the inflow capacity were small (in particular as the
access was delayed by leveling works). Waiting times often amounted to several
hours, and access to entertainment, food, water, and toilets must have been
quite limited outside the festival area.
Nevertheless, the problems on the ramp were even more serious than at
the access points. They were related to the low inflow to the festival area (see
Table 1). An analysis of surveillance videos suggests that the floats (i.e. the
moving music trucks) ‘pulled’ visitors along with them, as expected by the
planners, but this was not apparently effective enough. After the crowd dis-
aster, it was sometimes claimed that the floats even obstructed the inflow of
arriving visitors. While the inflow never stopped completely before the cordons
were established [174], the queue forming at the top of the ramp varied consid-
erably over time [174–176]. The inflow was particularly low, when a float was
slowed down or stopped around 15:31 in the neighborhood of the ramp [177].
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While the organizers considered the possibility of inflow problems [53,96],
they assumed that these could be handled by ‘pushers’1 at the upper end of
the ramp and that the floats could be used as well to reduce them (by at-
tracting the crowd onto the festival area and moving it along with them) [53].
However, there was apparently a lack of a sufficient number of pushers [56],
and the floats did not manage to overcome the inflow problem. It looks like
the floats were slowed down by the dense crowd, which in turn obstructed the
inflow of visitors, thereby creating an unfavorable feedback loop. The situa-
tion was particularly tense from 14:27 to 15:05 and from 15:55 to 17:00; as
a consequence, the crowd manager asked for support by the police at 15:16
(or before) [41]. The responsible officer arrived around 15:30, when a jam had
formed on the upper part of the ramp [74]. About 10 minutes later, a joint
strategy was found. However, already at 15:31 (i.e. at the time when one of
the floats slowed down in front of the ramp), the situation had deteriorated
so much that a large amount of visitors decided to overcome fences along the
ramp to reach the festival area via the grassy slopes on both sides (see Fig.
1) [120, 174, 175]. This mitigated the bottleneck situation at the end of the
ramp, which could have caused serious problems at a much earlier time. In
fact, it seems that the dangerous phenomenon of crowd turbulence (see Sec.
3.4) first occurred in the upper part of the ramp [176].
According to Table 3, the first visitors used the narrow staircase at 16:17,
and around 16:22 the first people climbed the pole on the East side of the lower
ramp area, to get up to the festival area [73]. The first people climbed the
container of the crowd management on the South of the ramp at 16:24 [178].
This was the time, when the third police cordon is given up. While the initial
flow on the staircase was stopped by police, people used the staircase again
around 16:27. At about the same time, a person climbed a traffic sign on
the ramp [116] (see Fig. 1). All of this might have been interpreted by the
security as signs of an excited crowd that did not behave properly, but the
temporal coincidence of these events clearly shows that people were trying
to escape from the crowd in any possible way, because they felt in danger.
In fact, behavior of the crowd that might have been perceived as ‘improper’
occurred mainly, after the first two cordons had to be given up (around 16:14
and 16:21), while the third one was still closed, which caused an increasingly
crowded situation on the ramp.
In videos recorded at the Love Parade, the phenomenon of crowd turbu-
lence starts to appear between 16:34 and 16:36 [126]. Around the same time
one can hear painful shouts, and some people scream for their lives and for
help [123] (see Table 4). In this situation, at least some people must have
experienced a psychological state of panic. Nevertheless, there were no signs
of sudden systematic movements of the crowd into a certain direction, which
would indicate a stampede, and no people ‘crawled’ on top of others, yet.
Around 16:40, the forces in the crowd were so critical that a traffic sign was
1 ‘Pushers’ are people, who are supposed to put pressure on visitors to keep moving, in
this case to ensure an efficient entering into the festival area in order to avoid an obstruction
of other visitors trying to get in.
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bent [125], and an unconscious women was passed on to the narrow stair-
case [128]. Around 16:45, several people tried to elevate themselves out of the
crowd by climbing a billboard next to the traffic sign [131]. Approximately at
the same time, many people between the billboard and the staircase raised
their arms into the air [132] (the movie should be watched in full screen mode
to see this well). This is usually a sign that they have fallen to the ground and
are seeking help from others to get back on their feet. We believe that this was
the first sign that people were dying or likely to die. At 16:51, an emergency
vehicle entered the ramp, but it was taking care of other problems [73]. Still,
there were no sudden moves into one direction visible in the crowd that would
speak for a stampede. Rather, people next to those screaming for their lives
were trying to calm them down by saying “you will make it,” and offering them
water [179]. Around 16:55, a group of people was pushing their way through
the crowd towards the tunnel in the West (in Ref. [135] this can be seen be-
tween 1:28 and 1:35 in full screen mode; the same shows up in Ref. [180]).
Around the same time, some people were trying to ‘crawl’ over others, hoping
to escape the situation [135,136]. While this was clearly a relentless and poten-
tially harmful behavior, it is not obvious that it killed others, and it occurred
under circumstances that were absolutely life-threatening (which should not
be misunderstood as a justification of such relentless behavior.) First deaths
were reported at 17:02 [41,54].
3.2 Were people killed by others falling on them from above?
As most people died between the staircase and the billboard [54], the public
media initially assumed that they were victims of others, who had fallen down
after unsuccessfully trying to climb the staircase from the side or to climb the
billboard [161]. There was even a statement that the staircase should have been
“blasted away” before the event [181]. However, the videos viewed by us do not
provide convincing evidence that falling people were the cause of the disaster.
It is also not plausible that a few people falling from the staircase could account
for 21 fatalities and more than 500 injured people [46]. Moreover, the height
of falling was not large, and most victims were not lying on the side of the
staircase, but rather between the staircase and the entrance of the tunnel [182]
(see “accident area” in Fig. 1).
Nevertheless, the analysis of the video materials and photographs witnesses
at least three events of falling people. According to Ref. [54], the first one
happened around 16:57 at the billboard, the second shortly later at the same
place. The third incident happened at the same location at 17:03. Furthermore,
one person failed to climb the staircase from the side; around 16:40 it fell back
to the ground from a low elevation [183]. Apparently, the height of falling was
relatively small, and the falling people also did not trigger a stampede of the
crowd. Therefore, according to our judgment, it is unlikely that people died
as a direct consequence of others falling down from the staircase or billboard.
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3.3 Did the Staircase Cause a Crowd Crush?
Nevertheless, it is a valid question, whether it was a mistake to let people use
the staircase. It is likely that people were turning towards the staircase, hoping
that it would provide a chance to escape, and that even a minor movement
could seriously increase the local pressure in the crowd, given the high density
that had already built up on the ramp. In fact, the situation in the crowd
was highly problematic not only next to the staircase [72], but also next to
the pole [126], and it was apparently the use of the pole that inspired the
use of the staircase [184]. Nevertheless, the movement of the crowd towards
these improvised ‘emergency exits’ was not large. The videos we have seen do
not show the sudden start waves, which are typical when a waiting crowd (or
jammed traffic) starts moving [104,171]. Therefore, we doubt that the fatalities
were caused just by a relentlessly forward pushing crowd, which crushed the
people. Crushing due to extreme densities rather happens when a large crowd
moves too quickly towards a narrowing [32]. In Duisburg, however, the crowd
disaster happened in a crowd that barely moved forward. Even though the
situation on the ramp was critical for the crowd from 16:35 on [73], it seems
that most people had a chance to breathe (at least intermittently) and to
recover between stressful periods. In fact, the recordings change many times
between screams of panic and more positive noises.
We do not question that the density in the crowd became so high at some
locations that it could seriously harm health and lives, but it is puzzling that
most victims were not found on the side of the staircase, or next to the pole(s)
and the container, where they had to be expected in case of a crowd crush.
We also do not deny that the staircase was an attraction point, but we doubt
that it can be seen as immediate cause of the disaster. It may have even played
a significant role for the evacuation of the overcrowded ramp, since it served
as emergency exit. However, this emergency exit was used too late and not
very efficiently. A continuous flow of people on the staircase was established
only around 16:40 [73, 179]. Before, it stopped or was blocked many times.
The same happened during the most critical period, when many people tried
to climb the staircase from the side, which considerably obstructed the flow
on it [185].
3.4 Occurrence of Crowd Turbulence
So far, the cause of the crowd disaster in Duisburg has still not been revealed.
If the crowd did not panic, and people did not die from others falling on them,
and a rush towards the narrow staircase did not cause the crowd disaster,
what then was the reason for it? The answer lies in the dynamics of the
crowd, which unintentionally emerged, when the density became too high.
John Fruin describes the situation as follows [10]: “At occupancies of about 7
persons per square meter the crowd becomes almost a fluid mass. Shock waves
can be propagated through the mass, sufficient to ... propel them distances
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of 3 meters or more... . People may be literally lifted out of their shoes, and
have clothing torn off. Intense crowd pressures, exacerbated by anxiety, make
it difficult to breathe, which may finally cause compressive asphyxia. The heat
and the thermal insulation of surrounding bodies cause some to be weakened
and faint. Access to those who fall is impossible. Removal of those in distress
can only be accomplished by lifting them up and passing them overhead to
the exterior of the crowd.”
In fact, suffocation was diagnosed as the reason for the death of people
during the Love Parade disaster [47]. In simple words, this means that the
lungs of the victims have been compressed so much that they were unable to
breathe enough to get the required amount of oxygen to survive. Compressive
asphyxia was also identified as cause of death in many other crowd disasters.
According to recent studies [172], it is often not the density alone that
kills (‘crushes’) people, but the particular kind of dynamics that occurs when
the density is so high that physical interaction between people inadvertently
transfer forces from one body to another. Under such conditions, forces in
the crowd can add up. Force chains may form, such that the directions and
strengths of the forces acting on the body of an individual in the crowd are
largely varying and hard to predict. As a consequence, an uncontrollable kind
of collective dynamics occurs in the crowd, which is called ‘crowd turbulence’
or ‘crowd quake’ [16,172]. The forces in this dynamical state of the crowd can
cause various injuries (in particular of the chest, as in crowd crushes). They
are so high that they cannot even be controlled by large numbers of police
forces. Individuals can handle the situation even less. They are exposed to a
large risk of losing balance and stumbling [186].
Once people have fallen, they constitute obstacles to others and are en-
dangered by others falling on top of them, since these can also not control
their steps anymore as they wish. Hence, the surrounding people are likely to
stumble as well, which creates a ‘domino effect’ [187]. The resulting number
of falling people may be large. This creates a heap of people, in which nobody
can easily get back on their feet again. Those on the bottom have serious dif-
ficulties to breathe, and they are likely to suffocate if this state lasts too long,
given the weight of others on their top.
Directly after the Love Parade disaster, when the situation was far from
clear, one of the authors conjectured that ‘crowd turbulence’ was the likely
cause of the fatalities [188]. Eye witness reports [189] and the analysis of video
recordings confirms this hypothesis. Crowd turbulence can be observed in the
crowd at least from about 16:34 on around the pole and from 16:39 on in the
lower part of the ramp [190]. Before 16:48, a considerable number of people
fell to the ground between the tunnel and the staircase [132], approximately
at locations where computer simulations predict the largest crowd pressures
(see Fig. 2).2 The situation deteriorated further around 16:53, when crowd
turbulence affected almost the entire width of the ramp [135], i.e. hundreds or
2 Note that the fallen people in the video recording are in the shadow. Therefore, one
must use full screen mode to notice them, and one needs to watch out for arms raised in
the air, seeking for help.
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Fig. 2 Computer simulation of a densely crowded area with the heuristic pedestrian model
of Ref. [30] (figure from the Supporting Information). Orange and red areas indicate the
locations with the highest crowd pressure, when a densely packed crowd tries to move
around the corner. The simulated situation is analogous to leaving visitor streams at the
Love Parade in Duisburg, trying to leave the main ramp through the tunnel in the West.
Note, however, that the above simulation does not consider inflows of visitors arriving from
the East. These would move the high-pressure area a bit up the ramp, where the accident
actually happened.
even thousands of people were irregularly moved around by the pressure in the
crowd; many of them stumbled and fell on top of each other [135]. The troubled
area agrees with the one, where most victims were found [182,191]. Under the
weight of others lying on them, they must have eventually suffocated, since
there were not enough emergency forces to help them back on their feet in
time.
Public blogs have been wondering about the reasons for the layered crowd
of fallen people [192]:
1. Did the emergency vehicle driving on the densely crowded ramp trigger
the falling?
2. Was there a fence lying on the ramp, that should have covered a broken
manhole cover [193]?
While cars moving through a dense crowd can indeed trigger critical condi-
tions, it seems that people had already fallen to the ground (around 16:48),
before the emergency vehicle arrived on the ramp (around 16:50 [73]).3
A broken manhole cover or any kind of obstacle lying on the ground would
certainly have made it difficult for people to keep their balance and stay on
3 Moreover, video recordings of the situation around the emergency vehicle do not show
clear evidence of turbulent motion in its immediate neighborhood [194].
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their feet, when pushed around by turbulent waves. Such obstacles are dan-
gerous and should certainly not have been located in the bottleneck area (the
ramp). While, even without obstacles, it is likely that crowd turbulence would
have caused people to fall sooner or later, obstacles can act as ‘nucleation
points’ and thereby possibly trigger an earlier falling of people, which may
reduce their chances of survival.
4 Causal Interdependencies
We must now discuss the question, how the conditions, which caused the
deadly crowd turbulence, have come about.
4.1 Failure of Flow Control
When viewing the area of the Love Parade in Duisburg (see Fig. 1), the choice
of location appears surprising, since the festival area was relatively small and
furthermore constrained by railway tracks on one side (in the East) and by
a freeway on the other side (in the West). This becomes particularly clear
when comparing the area with the one used during the Love Parades in Berlin
(see Ref. [195]). As this circumstance implied a risk and the bottleneck at the
ramp during peak hours was foreseeable (see Sec. 2.2), flow control was crucial
for the safety of the Love Parade. However, there was a whole avalanche of
problems that accumulated and, thereby, caused the crowd disaster.
The first problem on the day of the Love Parade occurred when the opening
of the festival had to be delayed by approximately one hour due to a delay
in the completion of the leveling work (see Table 3). Therefore, many visitors
must have been queued up already at the time when the festival area was
opened. It seems that the organization of the mass event could never make up
for this delay.
The overall inflow capacity was apparently further reduced through ob-
structions by the floats, which had probably not been anticipated to that
extent (see Sec. 3.1). As a consequence of this, access control was necessary
already at 13:00 (see Table 2), much before the expected peak hours. This
further increased the queues and the waiting times. The following quote wit-
nesses the problems [196]: “We parked the car about 3 kilometers away from
the freight station (next to the festival area), and it took us almost 5 hours (!)
to get to the Love Parade (festival area). On the way, we were facing blocked
roads time and again, fences were carried over us, emergency forces could not
get through, people collapsed, ...”
Clearly, visitors of the event must have become impatient, particularly
because there was probably a lack of food, drinks and toilets outside of the
festival area (since such long waiting times were not anticipated). One could,
therefore, expect that it would be difficult to control the inflow. In this con-
nection, it is also worth noting that there was not much entertainment outside
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the festival area to shorten the psychological waiting time and to relieve stress
and impatience. Apparently, there was a stage outside the festival area, which
was supposed to absorb some of the visitors, who could not get to the festival
area, but for some obscure reason, it was moved to another area, where it
attracted only a smaller number of people [56].
Between 14:30 and 15:10, the organizers found it difficult to control the
inflow with the isolating devices (see Table 2). This was probably not just a
result of the excessive waiting times, which caused impatience, but possibly
also because some of their security people were needed elsewhere (e.g. to im-
prove the outflow from the ramp or to guide VIPs) [56]. As a consequence, the
organizers tried to get support by the police [56].
For a number of reasons, it seems to have taken a considerable amount
of time to get the requested police support. Communication by walkie talkies
and mobile phones did not work reliably [56]. There were also no functioning
loud speakers at the ramp, as there should have been [56]. Moreover, there was
a change of police shifts between 15:12 and 15:34, when the situation started
to deteriorate [56]. Various reports suggest that police and organizers were
not well coordinated, probably due to the afore-mentioned communication
problems. It is also likely that the following emergency operations had not
been exercised before. As a consequence, the police may have tried to solve
the problem with concepts they were familiar with. They formed several police
cordons for flow control. This tactic is often applied to get control of violent
crowds. However, it failed during the Love Parade, and we will now analyze
why.
4.2 A Lack of Overview of Everybody
As was pointed out in Sec. 2.3, when the crowd was trapped in a situation of
extreme density, it did not have a chance to get an overview of the situation
and possible ways to improve it, in particular to get out of the area. Signs and
loudspeaker announcements were not available. The only possible emergency
exits they could recognize were the narrow staircase, the pole(s), and the
container of the crowd management. They were used accordingly, which was
quite reasonable in the more and more dangerous situation that the crowd
found itself in.
At this time, all the hope to get control of the situation rested on the police.
The police may have been surprised by the sudden need to take control, which
was requested by the crowd manager when difficulties to access the festival area
occurred at the upper end of the ramp. The police tried to solve the problem
by establishing cordons, but it was soon noticed that police cordons 1a, 2, and
3 (see Fig. 1) blocked not only the inflow, but the outflow as well. This is also
the reason why cordon 1a was moved behind the side ramp (see cordon 1b in
Fig. 1), and why police cordon 4 was formed at the upper end of the ramp
(after dissolving cordon 3). This would have allowed to re-direct the outflow via
the side ramp. However, before these operations could be completed, cordons
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1b and 2 had to be given up because of the increasing pressure in the waiting
crowd, while cordon 3 was still there [41].
It is known that dense counter-flows are unstable and may give rise to
mutual blockages, which can cause crowd disasters [12,197]. For such reasons,
it is recommended to separate the flow directions at mass events. Yet, it was not
the instability of dense counter-flows which caused the incident in Duisburg.
The lack of directional flow separation, however, did not allow one to clear
the ramp, after it became crowded by the dissolution of two of the cordons.
When cordons 1b and 2 had to be given up, the police suddenly found itself
in a situation, where in- and outflows blocked each other, and it was basically
impossible to evacuate the ramp in conventional ways, when people quickly
accumulated on both sides of cordon 3. A trap without exits or emergency
exits resulted, from which people could not get out, and the situation kept
getting worse [198].
For people in the crowd, it was impossible to gain a sufficient overview of
the situation and to find a solution. Police had helicopter surveillance [199]
and was filming the ramp from the top. However, it took some time until the
criticality of the situation was noticed and evacuation measures were taken.
When the evacuation finally became effective, the ramp cleared quickly [158].
But prompt action was delayed by communication problems. It seems that
the first loudspeaker announcement could only be made around 17:30, after a
loudspeaker vehicle had entered the ramp [200].
Why did the evacuation start so late? The analysis of the police is pre-
sented in Table 5. It seems that first attempts to direct the crowd towards
the upper end of the ramp started around 16:40 [54, 201], but were not very
effective [41]. It is true that evacuation attempts take some time, but there
was also a lack of efficient means of communication (such as loudspeakers or
megaphones). Moreover, we would like to point out the following: In crisis
situations, decision-makers are often overwhelmed by the pace of events [202],
mainly for two reasons: First, it takes time to collect information locally, and
bring it to the attention of the chief police officer, who then takes a decision and
gives commands. These are then transmitted down to the local police forces
through the command chain. Second, critical situations are often character-
ized by incomplete, contradictory, and ambiguous information, which makes
it difficult to assess the situation correctly and come to the right conclusions.
When the situation on the ramp became unbearable and life-threatening,
people started to escape via the pole, the container and the staircase next
to the ramp. This could have been misinterpreted as aggressive attempts of
impatient visitors to storm the festival area, but in reality, it was a sign of
emergency. However, due to the noise level, screams for help [140, 141] were
hard to comprehend. Also visitors (on the East), looking on the ramp from
above around 16:30 did not have a sense of emergency [203]. This makes it
understandable, why pressure relief operations were not yet effective, when
the crowd disaster was about to start.
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14:27-
15:05,
15:55-17:00
Queues of arriving visitors form at the upper end of the main ramp, which
leads to the festival area. For this case it was planned (1) to use ‘pushers’
in order to make the people move forward, (2) to close the access points
in the East and West in front of the tunnels, (3) to make loudspeaker
announcements [pp. 20+13].
15:16 The crowd manager asks for police support via the liaison officer [p. 31].
Around
15:30
The relevant police officer arrives at the container of the crowd manager
[p. 31].
15:30-15:40 Crowd manager and this police officer jointly decide (1) to ask crowd man-
agement/security staff to work as ‘pushers’ in order to ensure a better inflow
into the festival area from the upper end of the ramp, (2) to close the access
points for approximately 10 minutes, (3) to form a cordon in the middle of
the ramp in order to shield visitors trying to enter the festival area from
behind. [pp. 20+31]
15:45 In the discussion with other police officers, this plan is modified towards
forming 2 police cordons in the tunnels to the West and to the East [p. 22].
15:50-16:20 Police cordon 1 is formed in the tunnel in the West (first before the side
ramp and then after it from 16:02 on in order to allow people to use the
side ramp) [p. 21].
15:57-16:16 Police cordon 2 is formed in the tunnel in the East [p. 21].
16:01-16:24 A third police cordon is formed in the middle of the ramp in order to avoid
that visitor flows returning from the Love Parade would undermine police
cordons 1 and 2 from behind [p. 21+22].
Around
16:10
When arriving at the relevant area of the ramp, the responsible officer dis-
covers that (1) many people are trying to leave the festival area and (2)
the expected dissolution of the jam at the upper end of the ramp did not
happen within the 10 minute time period foreseen for this. Therefore, the
blockage of the inflows by cordons 1 and 2 must be maintained longer than
planned. Due to this delay and since the access points must be intermit-
tently opened, the pressure on police cordons 1 and 2 becomes so high that
they must be given up [p. 23].
16:24 Visitors are jammed up on both sides of police cordon 3. The situation
becomes extremely crowded [p. 24]. Therefore, police cordon 3 is dissolved,
also because it is “ineffective” between two oppositely directed flows [pp.
24+34].
16:31 A new (transparent) police cordon is formed at the upper end of the ramp
from 16:31 on [pp. 21+24]. It serves to stop the outflow of leaving visitors
via the main ramp and to encourage arriving visitors to use the slopes to
enter the festival area (see Fig. 1).4 [pp. 24+34]
16:39 The fire brigade reports ‘panic-like’ movements on the ramp with some
over-run people [p. 25].
16:40-16:55 The festival area is closed for newly arriving visitors (by moving vehicles
in front of the access points) [pp. 25+35].
After evac-
uation of
ramp area
Some densely crowded spots remain around the container, two poles and
the narrow staircase. It is not possible to redirect them by words or gestures
[pp. 34+35]
Table 5 Course of events as presented in the police report [41]. The numbers in square
brackets correspond to the page numbers of the report.
Once the evacuation process on the ramp started, the area emptied quickly
[158]. The narrow staircase also might have played an important role as an
emergency exit at this time [179]. Others managed to leave the ramp towards
the festival area, following the emergency vehicle [204]. However, people close
4 This was previously prevented by fences.
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to the staircase were still focused on it [184]. This might have been a result
of the ‘tunnel vision’ that develops when people are stressed. Even when the
surrounding crowd had dissolved, it took a long time, until those who had
fallen to the ground between the tunnel in the West and the staircase got back
on their feet, if they managed this at all [135,191]. In fact, many of them were
injured or died.
A lack of overview is typical for crises situations. During the Love Parade
disaster in Duisburg this is, for example, reflected by the fact that, around
15:06, the minister of interior visited the Love Parade (see Table 3), but despite
first signs of overcrowding, he left the festival area before the incident. At 16:47,
the organizer gave an interview, which still called the event a success [96], and
as late as 17:15, the city’s situation room made a similar statement [156]. Emer-
gency forces were also responding late. As a consequence, a triage procedure
had to be applied. (This procedure is typical for war zones, major disasters,
and terrorist attacks.) Therefore, many people in critical health conditions did
not get first aid [205].
5 Discussion
In the following, we try to gain an integrative view of causal factors of the
crowd disaster, which strictly needs to be distinguished from a legal analysis
or a determination of responsibilities. We also want to stress that the main
purpose of our analysis is to learn for the future, i.e. to identify factors that
need to be paid more attention to.
5.1 Resilience, Systemic Instabilities, and Cascading Effects
Note that, generally, a good organizational concept should be resilient (‘forgiv-
ing’), i.e. it should be robust to mistakes and complications. Therefore, many
disasters do not have a single causing factor. They are a result of interaction
effects. This also applies to the Love Parade disaster which, as we will argue
below, can be understood as result of a systemic instability.5 The term ‘sys-
temic instability’ is used here for situations, where small perturbations can
trigger a series of events through mutual amplification effects in a way that
things eventually get out of control, even if everyone makes best efforts. At
the Love Parade, people were dying although nobody wanted this and every-
one was trying to prevent the death of people. Other examples for systemic
instabilities are
– spontaneous breakdowns of traffic flows above a certain critical density
(even when everyone is driving in a circle and trying hard to maintain a
finite speed) [104,206],
5 or even several interrelated systemic instabilities (since the phenomenon of ‘crowd tur-
bulence’ itself can be seen as outcome of an instability of visitor flows)
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– breakdowns of cooperation in social dilemma situations, which give rise to
‘tragedies of the commons’ [207],
– political revolutions [208–210] and
– financial breakdowns [211,212].
Many systemic instabilities come along with cascading effects, which tend to
create extreme events [211, 213, 214]: the overload of one component of the
system challenges other components, which therefore causes a propagation of
problems through the system. Usually, cascading effects do not occur dur-
ing normal operation, but are triggered by (random) perturbations or the
coincidence of several complicating factors. They tend to occur when the in-
terdependencies in the system exceed a critical strength. For example, cas-
cading effects are observed in traffic jam formation (when the density is too
high) [104], blackouts of power grids, for many kinds of disasters [215], for the
current financial crisis [211], and for the Arab Spring revolutions [208–210].
5.2 What Caused the Crowd Disaster: Causal Interdependencies of
Contributing Factors
The following analysis discusses cascading effects that have (most likely) con-
tributed to the Love Parade disaster in Duisburg (see Fig. 3 for an illustration).
– Berlin rejects to host the Love Parade (LP), and other cities take over [47].
The Love Parade moves from city to city, which creates new organizational
challenges each time (in more difficult locations than in Berlin with its wide
roads and expansion areas). The change of organizational teams makes it
difficult to accumulate crowd management experience over many events.
– Bochum has to cancel its Love Parade, because it cannot manage the se-
curity challenges [47].
– Duisburg/Essen is elected as cultural metropole 2010 [216]. It is under
pressure to come up with an attractive cultural program. This seems to
have created a desire to approve the Love Parade [56,86].
– The festival area does not provide capacity reserves and implies a number of
organizational difficulties. In the tunnel and on the ramp, in- and outflows
are not separated, and there is no separate route for emergency vehicles
(i.e. they have to use the tunnel as well).
– To overcome security concerns, an evacuation study is commissioned. It
mainly focuses on evacuation scenarios [53], assuming a maximum concur-
rent number of visitors as it was required by the security concept of the
city [56].6
– Due to the late approval of the event (see Table 3), the security concept may
have been finished ‘last minute’ (and vice versa). The likely consequence
is that contingency plans may have been insufficient and could not be
6 Some tolerable risks associated with the normal entering and leaving of the area are
mentioned, but have not been investigated in detail by computer simulations.
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Fig. 3 Illustration of causal interdependencies between different factors that have most
likely contributed to the emergence of the crowd disaster during the Love Parade in Duisburg.
One can see that the reason for the crowd disaster was not a single factor, but amplifying
feedback and cascading effects, as it is typical for systemic instabilities. Therefore, most
contributing factors are consequences of other factors. Also note that causal dependencies
have to be clearly distinguished from legal responsibilities. (Question marks indicate likely
contributing factors, which we have not proven by us in a strict sense, but are plausible
conclusions that are not questioned by any counter-evidence known to us.)
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exercised enough. There was probably also not enough time to ensure a
good coordination between organizers and police forces.
– Due to delays in finishing the leveling work (see Table 3), the festival area of
the Love Parade is opened later than expected [217]. This implies an early
overload of the access points and causes an impatient crowd (particularly
as facilities, supply and entertainment were probably scarce outside the
festival area).
– People enter the Love Parade area later and return earlier than expected.
– The interaction of the floats with the crowd does not enable a sufficient
inflow to the festival area. This apparently requires that crowd management
forces are moved away from the isolating devices to the end of the ramp, in
order to improve the inflow; requested VIP support seems to absorb some
manpower as well [56].
– The crowd management faces problems to control the isolation devices,
and it tries to organize police support [56].
– There are difficulties in the communication and coordination between or-
ganizers and police. Suitable communication means are missing or not used
or are not working in a reliable way [56]. Therefore, the feedback between
the situation, the crowd management, and the crowd is insufficient.
– Due to communication problems and a change in police shifts, police sup-
port may have been delayed [56]. Moreover, it must have been difficult for
the new shift to get an overview of the situation.
– Maybe due to the urgency of the situation, it is decided to form two police
cordons in the tunnels leading to the ramp. A third police cordon is estab-
lished in the middle of the ramp, where fences narrow down the diameter
of the ramp. It shall prevent that leaving visitors undermine the police
cordons in the tunnel from behind [41].
– The police cordons in the tunnel are given up, probably because of the high
pressure of the arriving crowd. This replaces the problem at the upper end
of the ramp by an even bigger problem in the middle of it: A lot of visitors
are moving into the lower ramp area through the tunnel, while many others
are waiting at the upper end to leave the event. As the third cordon blocks
in- and outflows, jams of arriving and leaving visitors are quickly growing
on both sides of cordon 3. The cordon is dissolved, because it is ineffective,
and a new police cordon is formed at the upper end of the ramp.
– At this time, the situation in the crowd is already critical. The lack of
separation of opposite flow directions makes it difficult to let people out
without letting people in [217]. Therefore, it is impossible to evacuate the
ramp efficiently.
– People on the ramp try to escape the life-threatening situation over the
staircases, the pole(s), and the container (see Sec. 3.1). This may have
been misinterpreted as a ‘mob’ trying to force its way into the festival
area, which needs to be controlled. Pressure relief efforts become effective
only very late.
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– In absence of separate emergency routes, fences and cordons must be
opened to allow an emergency vehicle to pass [41] (see Table 3). This
creates openings for a further inflow of people.
– The overcrowded situation causes dangerous ‘crowd turbulence’ (see Sec.
3.1). Many people are falling and pile up on top of each other. Emergency
forces cannot reach people quickly enough. 21 of them die of suffocation,
and more than 500 are injured [46,164].
– As an unexpectedly large number of people need help, there are not enough
emergency forces at the location of the accident [218]. Therefore, a triage
procedure is applied in the tunnel [205]. As a consequence, many people in
critical health conditions do not receive first aid.
5.3 What Might Have Stopped the Feedback and Cascading Effects
Overall, one gets the impression that problems occurred on all sides (but we
admit that it is easier to identify them afterwards than at the time when deci-
sions must be taken on the basis of often limited and imperfect information).
The above analysis shows that things went wrong from the very beginning,
and that the situation increasingly got out of control over time. However, we
believe that there were also many possibilities to mitigate or overcome prob-
lems that contributed to the disaster. Therefore, we will now discuss, how the
deadly cascading effect described in the previous subsection might have been
stopped or how its size and impact could have been reduced:
– One might have been able to find a better suited area for the organization
of the event.
– One could have required higher organizational standards (such as a sepa-
ration of flow directions).
– The decision to hold the event or not could have been taken earlier. This
would have facilitated a better preparation and a better coordination. It
would also have reduced the commercial and public pressure in case of
deciding against the event.
– Safety and security concerns could have been taken more seriously. The
fact that the responsible police officer quit his job [56] could have been
seen as advance warning sign.
– Superior contingency plans could have been elaborated, in order to be
better prepared for the occurrence of various problems. This applies par-
ticularly to the handling of the main bottlenecks of the system: the ramp
and the access points.
– If the evacuation study had raised serious concerns, this might have been
able to stop the approval of the event.
– The various stakeholders could have foreseen larger safety margins and
more reserves (also in terms of staff).
– It might have been possible to work out a different flow concept, which
separates in- and outflows. A circulatory flow organization (where people
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would come in via the tunnels and both ramps, but leave over the closed-
down freeway) would have been interesting to consider.
– Obstacles on the ramp (such as the food stand, fences in the way, and
police cars) could have been avoided.
– Efforts could have been made to ensure better communication between the
different stakeholders (by reserving [more] priority lines in the mobile phone
network) and better communication between the organizers and the crowd
(by installing loudspeakers at the ramp and elsewhere). A loudspeaker
vehicle could have been moved to the ramp, when it was noticed that no
loudspeaker equipment was available on the ramp (around 14:00, see Table
3), or megaphones could have been used to communicate with the crowd.
– When it became clear that people had difficulties to enter the festival area
and jams formed on the ramp, one might have been able to move the floats
further away from the ramp. Moreover, the side ramp could have been used
to avoid the jam on the main ramp.
– The use of more ‘pushers’ might have been able to increase the outflow
from the ramp to the festival area [56] (but it is not clear how effective
this measure would have been, given that the entrance area to the festival
ground was quite packed).
– More emergency forces (rescue units) could have been positioned on the
ramp and next to it.
– When it was recognized that the crowd management and control did not
work as expected, the first police shift might have been extended.
– When the situation became crowded, cordons could have been established
at the isolation devices and at the end of the main ramp. The outflow
of people could have been redirected (either via the side ramp or via the
emergency exits).
– With loudspeakers or megaphones, people on the overcrowded ramp could
have been evacuated earlier and in a more effective way, e.g. by organizing
an outflow from the ramp to the festival area behind the chain of police
cars that were standing on the ramp (see Fig. 1). Additionally, a continuous
evacuation via the staircase could have been established from 16:15 on
(or even from 15:31 on, when people needed to use the slopes to get on
the festival area) [221]. Furthermore, the tunnels could have been used to
evacuate the ramp, if the flow directions would have been separated.
Given the above alternatives, the crowd disaster might have been avoided
in many ways. Already around 13:00 there were first signs that the crowd
management concept would not work as planned (see Table 2. Between 14:30
and 15:15 it was noticed that the ramp constituted a bottleneck that could get
out of control. Around 16:25, people climbing the pole, staircase and container
were serious warning signs of a critical situation (see Sec. 3.1). At this time,
it would probably have been possible still to evacuate the ramp, if suitable
communication tools had been used. However, the ramp emptied only after
17:00.
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6 Lessons to be Learned and Recommendations
6.1 Summary
One of the noteworthy points of the Love Parade disaster is that most evidence
is available online, which allows many scientists and also the broader public to
form an opinion. This dramatically changes the situation compared to many
previous disasters, where a lot of evidence is of confidential nature, accessible
only to a small number of experts. We believe that the new openness of data
can have many beneficial effects on society. This study, for example, hopes to
make a contribution to a better understanding of crowd disasters and their
avoidance in the future. The accessibility of the materials can also serve orga-
nizers of mass events, the police and emergency forces to prepare themselves
better.
Through the analysis of publicly available materials and videos, we could
identify many factors that have contributed to the Love Parade disaster. Our
judgement is that the capacity of the area of the mass event already implied
various problems, which the organizational concept wanted to overcome by
crowd control. However, the delayed start of the event and the unexpected
obstruction of the inflow to the festival area from the ramp (i.e. two factors
which were probably not anticipated) caused queues that were difficult (or
impossible) to manage. Already in the organizational phase, but also in the
attempt to manage the flows, many problems came together, and the mutual
interaction of these problems made the situation worse. In particular, the
cordons that were intended to dissolve the jam at the entrance to the festival
area did not yield the expected relief. While they might have worked in case
of unidirectional flows, the situation became worse due to the fact that a
flow of returning visitors encountered an inflow of arriving people without a
separation of the flow directions. From the very beginning, the interaction of
many factors resulted in cascading effects, which eventually created a situation
that got totally out of control (see Fig. 3).
Organizational concepts for mass events are supposed to be robust to the
occurrence of single perturbations (‘single points of failure’). This in itself,
however, does not exclude the possibility that the coincidence or interaction
of problems can cause a systemic failure. When certain factors have amplify-
ing effects on other factors (or there are even feedback loops), this can create
systemic instabilities. We learn from this that, in order to reach a resilient
organization of mass events (and actually any complex system), it is not suffi-
cient to ensure the robustness of each contributing factor. One must also study
their interaction effects, to guarantee that the overall organization is resilient
to the coincidence of unfavorable factors as much as possible.
Our study also sheds new light on issues that have been controversially dis-
cussed. Immediately after the Love Parade disaster, the behavior of the crowd
and the staircase were blamed for the fatalities. However, our analysis yields a
different interpretation: the Love Parade incident shows the typical features of
crowd disasters, such as the existence of bottlenecks (and therefore the accu-
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mulation of large numbers of people), organizational problems, communication
failures, problematic decisions, coordination problems, and the occurrence of
crowd turbulence as a result of high crowd densities.
It is likely that the staircase encouraged a movement of the crowd towards
it, when people were trying to escape from the life-threatening density in the
ramp area, but the collective movement seems to have been small (it is not
clearly visible in the video recordings). In any case, effective measures (such
as an evacuation of the crowd) should have been taken long before critical
conditions developed. Given the high density in the ramp area, the occurrence
of crowd turbulence or ‘crowd quakes’ was unavoidable. In this dynamical state
of the crowd, the lives of people are in serious danger, as people will fall sooner
or later. The triggering of this deadly dynamics does not require a particular
reason.
Furthermore, note that the pushing in the crowd at high densities is not
necessarily a result of violent behavior, but of the fact that physical forces are
transmitted via the bodies of others and adding up. Under such conditions,
it is very difficult to keep control over the motion of one’s own body, since
one is literally moved around by the crowd. The situation in the crowd is
difficult also, because no one has an overview of the scene, and the noise level
(as well as the overload of the mobile phone network) make communication
largely impossible. While the conditions in the crowd were likely to cause
a high level of stress, this was a reasonable response to the life-threatening
situation. However, a mass panic was most likely not the cause of the Love
Parade disaster. The video recordings from the Love Parade do not provide
evidence for a stampede of people, while the dangerous phenomenon of crowd
turbulence is clearly visible.
Note that crowd disasters during religious pilgrimage in the past recently
led to important insights and also to significant improvements of crowd man-
agement and control [16–20]. Many of the lessons learned can also be trans-
ferred to other mass events in order to improve their safety. The authors
propose to consider the following points (besides the official regulations, of
course):
– Large mass events should preferably take place in locations where experi-
ence with the management of large crowds already exists for a long time. It
should at least involve some experts who have participated in the organi-
zation of previous mass events and know how to handle critical situations.
Local organizing teams should be supported by experienced national or
supranational professionals.
– The security concept should be finished, distributed, discussed, and exer-
cised at a pre-specified date well in advance of the event.
– The event must be planned on the basis of the number of expected people,
not on the basis of capacity.
– An organizational concept that requires keeping many people out or delays
them for hours should be avoided.
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– Facilities (e.g. toilets), supply (particularly food and water), as well as
entertainment should be ensured also for people on the way to the festival
area and for those waiting to enter.
– One should implement ways preventing pressure on decisions that may
have impact on the safety and security of people. It should not be possi-
ble to ignore qualified minority opinions. Contradictory voices should be
documented and seriously addressed.
– Consultants should be encouraged to comment on any critical issues (even
beyond the scope of the commissioned analysis).
– An analysis of the expected inflows and outflows (and, hence, number of
participants) needs to be performed, considering the possibility of large
flow variations. A bottleneck analysis is crucial. It must also take into ac-
count moving bottlenecks such as floats, but also the operation of police
or emergency vehicles. Confluence, turning and intersection points should
be determined. In this context, computer simulations with state-of-the art
pedestrian software can be useful, but model parameters must be carefully
chosen. Note that computer simulations can often help to identify crowded
areas, but they are not sufficient to reveal all kinds of organizational chal-
lenges.
– Critical points should be removed, and it must be checked, whether the re-
maining problems can be safely handled by crowd management and control
measures also under adverse conditions. Safety margins (such as capacity
reserves) should be foreseen [16], and detailed contingency plans should
be worked out for likely and unlikely events, and exercised. (Contingency
plans serve to reduce the need of improvisation and to ensure a quick and
effective response to any occurring problems.) Interaction, cascading and
side effects of complicating factors should be analyzed as well. Remain-
ing areas and factors of concern must be continuously monitored (e.g. by
video surveillance and special software for real-time analytics [219]). Suffi-
cient security and emergency forces should always be present to remove or
at least mitigate problems early on. Delays in response must be avoided,
as they tend to reinforce problems, i.e. quick action is often key to effective
counter-measures [220]. To stop possible interaction and cascading effects,
suitable decoupling strategies should be implemented.
– Pressure relief and evacuation strategies must be prepared for any poten-
tially critical areas. Evacuation measures must be started before an area
becomes over-crowded.
– Intersecting flows should be avoided and different flow directions should be
separated (as dense counter-flows are unstable and dangerous [12,197]). A
‘circular’ flow organization, preferably with alternative routes, should be
considered [222]. Moreover, space for emergency vehicles and operations
should be reserved.
– Fences are not good everywhere. They may turn into obstacles and create
dangerous situations. Therefore, the use of fences (or cordons) to stop
large numbers of people needs to be carefully considered, as they may be
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ineffective or deteriorate the situation. In many cases, it is safer to keep
people moving (e.g. by re-routing people) rather than stopping them.
– Situational awareness and well-functioning communication are crucial. Quick
information feedback about the situation in any relevant place and about
any relevant factor must be ensured. It is important to have an efficient
information flow between the different people and institutions involved (or-
ganizers, police, emergency forces, crowd, ...).
– In case of problems, the corresponding contingency plan should be applied,
and the situation should be continuously (re-)assessed to check for the
plausibility of the situational analysis, considering possible alternatives.
– It should be considered to give police and emergency forces more au-
tonomous (local) decision-making power and responsibility, particularly
when communication is interrupted or quick action is needed.
– Communication must work (both, from a technical and an organizational
perspective). It is key to detect, avoid, and respond to critical situations.
Communication is also crucial for the capacity to reduce undesirable inter-
action effects and to stop dangerous cascading effects.
– Finally, a safety culture must be actively promoted, reminding everyone
that problems can always happen. The motto should be: “Don’t take it
easy. Always expect the unexpected!” Preparations for all sorts of surpris-
ing situations (including a sudden change of the weather) should be made
as much as possible.
6.2 Some Common Misconceptions
As discussed before, our study questions a number of common views about
crowd disasters. This concerns the following points:
1. The word ‘pushing’ suggests that people would relentlessly push forward
towards their goal, not caring at all about others.
2. The concept of ‘mass panic’ sees a stampede as the origin of the crowd dis-
aster, resulting from a contagious mass psychological effect. It also assumes
that the crowd behaves unreasonably.
3. The term ‘crushing’ suggests that the cause of the crowd disaster is an un-
controlled pushing of a crowd towards a bottleneck, which creates densities
so high that the bodies of people are crushed.
4. The word ‘trampling’ [164] suggests that people walk carelessly over others.
Such views tend to blame the crowd for the disaster rather than drawing suit-
able consequences regarding the organization of mass events, the crowd man-
agement and communication. Therefore, recurring disasters may be a conse-
quence of misconceptions about them. In contrast to the above interpretations,
our analysis of the crowd disaster in Duisburg suggests the following:
1. It is the ‘queuing effect’ which causes a denser and denser queue of people
over time [171], and a lot of pushing in the crowd happens unintention-
ally. This is, because physical forces start to add up when the density
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becomes so high that people start to have body contact. Aggravating fac-
tors, which may lead to intentional pushing are (1) long waiting times
without food, water, facilities, and entertainment, (2) the absence of un-
derstandable, communicated reasons for the delays, and (3) threatening
high-density conditions.
2. The main danger are the laws of physics, not psychology [16, 30, 32, 172].
People do normally not die because they panic—they panic when their life
is in danger. We do not deny that people get impatient after long waiting
times and that some of them also disrespect rules in order to get towards
their goal (in particular if these rules do not appear justified to them). How-
ever, even under extremely critical conditions, people helped each other and
behaved quite rationally. They overcame barriers, used slopes, staircases,
poles and the container mainly, when this was necessary to evacuate them-
selves and reduce the density in the crowd. What might have appeared as
an unreasonable crowd forcing its way into the festival area may be better
interpreted as a crowd trying to find a way out of the dangerous trap it was
in. However, despite a rather rational behavior altogether, some individuals
suffered from ‘tunnel vision’, which is a phenomenon that can occur under
conditions of stress. This becomes evident from the fact that those stand-
ing around the poles, staircase and container, hoping to get out, were not
considering alternative emergency routes anymore, even when prompted
to them by the police [41,54].
3. One must distinguish between a ‘crush’ and a ‘crowd quake’, and between
(active) trampling and being trampled. In a classical crush, people are mov-
ing towards a physical bottleneck and die in front of its narrowest point. In
a ‘crowd quake’, there is typically no systematic flow directions, but people
are pushed around by fluctuating forces in the crowd. In Duisburg, peo-
ple’s lives were endangered not by a stampede that crushed other people,
but by high crowd pressures (defined as density times variability of body
movements [172]). An extreme and fluctuating pressure builds up, when
the densities become so high that they cause contact forces between bodies
to add up. This ultimately implies the onset of ‘crowd turbulence’. Under
such conditions, the sizes and directions of forces acting on the bodies of
visitors move them around in an uncontrolled way, and people have dif-
ficulties keeping their balance; when people stumble and fall, this can be
the nucleus of a crowd disaster [186] (see next point).
4. When trying to avoid the deadly ‘domino effect’, people may be forced to
step on others [187]. In Duisburg, only a few people were relentlessly ‘crawl-
ing’ or walking over the heads or shoulders of others. This happened around
16:55, when the ultimate inferno of the crowd disaster happened and it was
likely that (some) people had already died. Note, however, that many peo-
ple probably stepped on others who were lying on the ground. Why did
they do such a thing? In a dense and shaky crowd, fallen people have diffi-
culties to get up on their feet again. This may cause a ‘hole’ in the crowd,
so that the surrounding people are not anymore counter-balanced: they are
pushed from behind, but not anymore from the front. As a consequence,
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the surrounding people may fall one after another like dominos, causing
a pile of people [182, 187]. If they cannot get back on their feet quickly,
they are likely to pass out or suffocate, since they cannot breathe anymore
under the weight of others piling up on top of them. Therefore, to avoid
falling when pushed around by the crowd, people might be forced to step
on others. However, under these conditions, they are rather ‘walked’ than
‘walking’. That is, while the passive verb “being trampled” is correct, the
active form “trampling” is misleading.
6.3 Conclusion and “Natural Laws” of Crowd Behavior
It is obvious that situations such as the ones described above must be abso-
lutely avoided. This requires the choice of a suitable location and an adequate
preparation of the mass event, an appropriate organization and crowd manage-
ment, and a quick response to early warning signs, for which information and
communication play a key role. It is also important to understand that crowd
behavior follows certain “laws of nature”, which result from physical, physio-
logical, psychological and social needs of humans such as sufficient space, food,
water, and air, toilet facilities, feeling of safety, perceived progress towards
the goal, information, communication, entertainment, etc. An insufficient con-
sideration of such factors can promote disasters, particularly if shortcomings
accumulate.
6.4 Advance Warning Signs of Crowd Disasters
To improve the situational awareness of crowd managers, police and emergency
forces, Table 6 lists a number of successive warning signs of increasingly critical
crowd conditions.
6.5 Emerging Relevance of Citizen Science and Further Conclusions
In the subsection above, we have presented science-based suggestions for the
avoidance of crowd disasters and an organizational response to critical situ-
ations. Deriving these conclusions largely profited from the huge amounts of
materials that volunteers have provided, collected, synchronized, and ordered
(according to time, locations, content, etc.). This is, where ‘citizen science’
can play an important role. The documentation we have seen from volunteers
appears to be more transparent and complete than the information provided
by public institutions, and it is better accessible than news from many public
and private media (where we often faced the issue that materials could not be
retrieved anymore, at least not under the original links).
Also, scientific institutions would not have had enough resources to do all
the documentation work that was performed by these volunteers. However, the
collected materials are so voluminous that one can hardly see the wood for the
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Observation Assessment Required Action
0 Densities are
below 2-3 per-
sons per square
meter.
Normal operation
at low risk.
Regularly verify normal operation, watch
out for perturbations. Make sure that the
flow does not exceed the safe value of 82
persons per minute and meter.
1 People ac-
cumulate.
Certain areas
become pro-
gressively more
crowded.
People slow down
due to a bottle-
neck or stop for
some reason.
Limit inflows to ensure that the expected
extent of accumulation will not be ex-
ceeded. Gather information and determine
the reasons for the accumulation. Prepare
possible counter-measures. Move enough
security to the respective area. Inform the
responsible police and emergency units.
2 Jams of peo-
ple are forming
and growing.
Insufficient out-
flows may cause
serious problems
over time (such
as high densities),
particularly in
constraint spaces.
Communicate with the crowd. Promptly
take appropriate flow reduction measures
such as re-directing people. (Keep in mind
that stopping people causes a growing
pressure in the crowd and impatience.)
Move police and emergency units towards
the crowded area(s) in case help will be
needed.
3 Stop-and-go
waves occur
(this hap-
pens only in
dense mov-
ing crowds).
People are
pushed.
The continuous
flow has broken
down. The outflow
capacity is con-
siderably reduced.
The situation may
escalate quickly.
Take suitable counter-measures. Pressure
relief strategies (such as opening emer-
gency routes and re-routing inflows) should
be taken and people informed about them.
Before, any obstacles (such as fences) in
the way must be removed. A sufficient
number of emergency units and police
must be in the critical area and ready take
over control in interaction with the crowd
management.
4 People can-
not move
freely and are
squeezed be-
tween others.
People are
pushed around.
A critical density
has built up in
the crowd. Injuries
can easily happen.
Police should take over control in close
consultation with the crowd management.
Appropriate contingency plans must be
applied. Evacuation is strongly advised.
Communication with the crowd is crucial.
Emergency forces must be in the most
crowded areas, in order to provide first aid
whenever needed.
5 People disre-
spect fences or
try to get out
of the area.
The situation is
critical and likely
to get out of con-
trol.
Communicate with the crowd and evacu-
ate it. Provide help and first aid. Inform
hospitals and additional emergency units
about the possibility that the situation
may get out of control.
6 Crowd turbu-
lence occurs.
People scream
or shout for
help.
Injuries and fatal-
ities are likely. A
crowd disaster can
happen any time.
Calm down the crowd and guide it. Con-
tinue to evacuate people. Watch out for
the areas with the highest densities and
largest crowd movements, to ensure sup-
port and first aid. Additional emergency
vehicles must be called to ensure sufficient
manpower, and hospitals must be informed
about likely (and potentially many) in-
juries.
7 People are
falling to the
ground. People
raise arms into
the air.
People are in big
trouble. Many in-
juries are to be ex-
pected. A crowd
disaster is (most
likely) happening.
Immediate help and first aid are needed,
probably for many people. Hospitals must
be prepared to shift from routine to large-
scale emergency operation.
8 People crawl
over others.
A crowd disaster
has probably hap-
pened.
Apply rules for a state of serious emer-
gency.
Table 6 This table is intended to help assess the level of criticality of the situation in the
crowd and take proactive measures to avoid or at least mitigate crowd disasters. Note that
at each of these levels, one must already take first preparations for the next one or two
(as the situation may change quickly) and communicate the possible scenarios and their
implications to all relevant stakeholders. The goal is to de-escalate the situation and get
back to lower levels of criticality.
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trees. Therefore, citizen science can largely benefit from an interaction with
academic experts. Specialized knowledge is needed to distinguish more rele-
vant from less relevant factors, to interpret empirical evidence, and distinguish
more likely from less likely explanations. Besides providing this knowledge, our
work also highlights the general and systemic nature of crowd disasters, and
it reveals the instabilities (amplification effects) and cascading effects leading
to them.
The systemic nature of many crowd disasters makes their legal handling
very difficult, since it is hard to determine the fraction of responsibility that
different people and institutions had. However, without a proper response to
such systemic failures, people are losing their trust in public institutions, and
this undermines their legitimacy [223].
Crowd disasters are not the only systemic risk, resulting from interactions
and institutional settings that are not suitably designed. The financial crisis
is another example [211, 212], for which nobody seems to be willing to take
responsibility. This is mainly, because the individual contributions to it cannot
be well quantified. Also human history is full of examples of humanitarian dis-
asters, which happened because nobody felt sufficiently responsible for them.
The authors are convinced that the division of responsibility itself is the prob-
lem, and that this calls for political and regulatory attention. Scientists could
perhaps make a major contribution to the cultural heritage of humanity, if
they managed to find new ways to address this fundamental problem [224].
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16:39:20 SpaceCommander77 http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=gLdhwP4_IXM
16:39:26 FrEaKyLaDiiiEs http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=d1la2QTDBPU
16:39:38 GoofyMcPott http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=OOjNklbvxA8
16:41:27 pizzamanne 3 [from 16:41] http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=9DvH1BYFVCQ
16:41:40 SKAKnabe http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=prXmQBf27WI (removed)
72. Collection of synchronized videos by ‘pizzamanne’ (potentially incorrect time stamp
on videos in brackets):
1017 - ca. 15:38 (15:38 / 15:38:38) - http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=OGd1N6_hm1k
1019 - ca. 15:58 (15:58 / 15:58) - http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vdJzV26tL78
1022 - ca. 16:07 (16:07 / 16:07:12) - http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2_LfccdiSN0
1024 - ca. 16:08 (16:08; 16:08:49) - http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-4f8AMEstkM
1029 - ca. 16:11 (16:11 / 16:11:53) - http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_Zsmr9CelDY
1033 - ca. 16:15 (16:15 / 16:15:36) - http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_gJP2QVbwVs
1034 - ca. 16:17 (16:17 / 16:17) - http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=pweaCIXTs5U
1035 - ca. 16:18 (16:18 / 16:18) - http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=f00Mx8MY6y8
1037 - 16:22:55 (16:22 / 16:22:54) - http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Lkc7zgPv8y0
1038 - 16:24:49 (16:24 / 16:24:48) - http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=9wpVvSWa4_8
1039 - 16:28:24 (16:28 / 16:28:24) - http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=NmEcLa4OfvU
1040 - 16:30:33 (16:30 / 16:30:34) - http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Ra_j4kTOqqE
1041 - 16:35:11 (16:35 / 16:35:12) - http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=AYjlXhPcF4s
1043 - ca. 16:37 (16:37 / 16:37) -
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Od-DGsPlues
1044 - 16:38:22 (? / 16:38:24) - http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Y3qlzW-B9OM
1054 - 16:59:23 (16:59 / 16:59:35) - http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Uk9BXDdGJoQ
1055 - ca. 17:04:43 (?) (17:04 / 17:04:43) - http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=
qUBjVtjwl3o
1056 - ca. 17:06 (17:06 / 17:06) -
Schnipsel von 1 Sek. - http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=oCyzQ4NgVBU
1057 - 17:08:40 (17:08 / 17:08:50) - http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=iJ4NdwXa0Os
1058 - ca. 17:23 (17:23 / 17:23) - http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qtyC1YvwbEc
1065 - ca. 20:38 (20:38 / 20:38:35) - http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=UEFnUi5w7gs
1067 - ca. 20:47 (20:47 / 20:46:55) - http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ZsUHVV_k3r0
1068 - ca. 20:49 (20:49 / 20:49:31) - http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3UYacod0w6g
73. Collection of synchronized multi-view videos, by ‘pizzamanne’:
Part 1 (15:20-16:25): http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=V9cbqu5sEE0
Part 2 (16:25-16:34): http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=cDJaAvF0l7s
Part 3 (16:34-16:44): http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=sBE79UoxCF4
Part 4 (16:44-16:54): http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qJscpcZC45s
Part 5 (16:54-17:05): http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vooMCrcOXGs
Part 6 (17:05-17:20): http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=pOx_VHJd6G4
74. Video collection of ‘kaydee271’:
1/8 - ca. 15:25 - http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2fT7qKC8QOw
2/8 - ca. 15:35 - http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rrpYKGNlhdw
3/8 - 17:03:34 - http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=IoxPIvrFCNg
4/8 - 17:05:14 - http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=t3_3UIZS3dw
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5/8 - 17:09:41 - http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Kc8wEMiOxoo
6/8 - 17:11:19 - http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=gN4NNmxtRU4
7/8 - 17:12:08 - http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JfaLr_Y4U18
8/8 - 17:15:15 - http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=FYXQLgd_VA8
75. Video collection of ‘tr1nd’ (’Backtony’):
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vAxOeGUCZNI
76. Video collection of ‘real02’:
3/3 - 16:37:44 - http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=IdtR4Ks_n6I, also at http://www.
myvideo.de/watch/7673480/Massenpanik_Loveparade2010_3_3
1/3 - 16:58:19 - http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dP-5VOCU30U, also at http://www.
myvideo.de/watch/7673149/Massenpanik_Loveparade2010_1_3,
2/3 - 17:05:52 - http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=HvXwrbCjgf4, also at http://www.
myvideo.de/watch/7673325/Massenpanik_Loveparade2010_2_3
77. Video collection of ‘hitower78’:
1 - 16:36:17 (16:08:43 / 16:36:21 [16:37:27]) - http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=
0ioEPdfvZdw
2 - 16:50:23 (16:22:49 / 16:50:27) - http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=u2r1AFSuHNI
3 - 16:52:33 (16:24:59 / 16:52:37) - http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=IEtFZVOjsK4
78. Video collection of ‘Todesparade2010’:
1/10 - 16:15:52 (16:16) http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kVpkclRCXaQ
2/10 - ca. 16:22 (16:23) http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lFxyl9OaqHk
3/10 - 16:24:12 (16:25) http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_PQqBePT6ig
4/10 - 16:26:07 (16:27) http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=so6-7Ezeo3U
5/10 - ca. 16:29 (16:30) http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=VohMiM54wpA
6/10 - 16:29:44 (16:31) http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=WTiQ131QejE
7/10 - ca. 16:31 (16:32) http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qnZGcnWyJOM
8/10 - ca. 16:33 (16:34) http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3cVyb3W-GAM
9/10 - ca. 16:52 (16:53) http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=hPZiHkZQH98
10/10 - ca. 16:53 (16:54) http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2Pl1dVP8bA4
79. Video collection of ‘goonies11000’:
1 - 16:38:15 - http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6dReLGi1lnc
2 - 16:55:51 - http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=L9wfsupvD24
3 - 16:59:41 - http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rzz5geLWPV4
4 - 17:18:35 - http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qbQr5yAjqxs
80. Video collection of ‘coolwojtek’:
1 - 16:29:12 (16:28:42) - http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wsOyIBCMExM
2 - 16:44:44 (16:44:14) - http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8aTXT3ht8VU
3 - 16:48:34 (16:48:04) - http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1lHLIn78650
4 - 16:51:02 (16:50:32) - http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=XKo3rb5R_Dc
5 - 16:54:36 (15:53:36) - http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xxd_KlaCiNY
81. Video collection of ‘mbreezer’:
Summary - http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=OfQjXi3J3ns
0 - 16:38:36 - http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5uio5rSv520
1 - 16:47:31 - http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rgvG2Pp7yfc
2 - 16:51:41 - http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ofFd928JY6k
3 - 16:53:07 - http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3aodLRaPu0E
4 - 16:53:50 - http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=u8N3ZcqOgfU
5 - 16:55:05 - http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JdblWBmaM4Q
6 - 17:00:30 - http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=VTF0v-WY934
7 - 17:02:47 - http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=V-WKhjRMcRM
8 - 17:03:11 - http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=s2ywRwxfHbo
9 - 17:05:48 - http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=52KPyHrqkwY
82. Video collection of ‘The1art1of1hell’:
1 - 16:59:05 (16-58-09) - http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=YxIZwvvhpp8
2 - 17:03:28 (17-02-30) - http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=BbCrmUZeJoY
3 - 17:05:38 (17-03-33) - http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=NLC3vyp0b9U
4 - 17:07:30 (17-05-42) - http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=QcAVAYDolKc
5 - 17:08:48 (17-07-34) - http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-iCA6g984aY
44 D. Helbing and P. Mukerji
6 - 17:09:52 (17-08-51) - http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=LXLuoqNDJ-A
7 - 17:11:26 (17-09-31) - http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-7WDbM4EonY
8 - 17:12:28 (17-11-30) - http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=zCRGtjcbyw8
9 - 17:13:47 (17-12-32) - http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=gEa9_k-Th7U
10 - 17:14:50 (17-13-51) - http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_CiEkTPk9BQ
83. Video collection of ‘rkjorge70’:
1 - 17:10:44 - http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Nb0m_n0KGms
2 - 17:13:26 - http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qQbto4MNqOU
3 - 17:19:41 - http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=WR56iEfBQoo
84. Pictures of the Love Parade in Berlin, see: http://www.skyscrapercity.com/
showpost.php?s=dabeccde05e177be86cfa1009c0e245e&p=60946437&postcount=44
85. See http://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Weltjugendtag_2005,
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Marienfeld,
http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/Category:Marienfeld_%28World_Youth_Day%
29?uselang=de
86. The event was politically desired, see http://www.duisboard.de/forum/index.php?
page=Thread&postID=113125
87. Weidmann, U., Transporttechnik der Fußga¨nger (Schriftenreihe des Institut fu¨r
Verkehrsplanung, Transporttechnik, Straßen- und Eisenbahnbau 90, ETH Zu¨rich,
Zu¨rich, 1993).
88. Transportation Research Board, Highway Capacity Manual, Special Report 209 (Trans-
portation Research Board, Washington DC, 1985), see the chapter on pedestrians.
89. Polus, A., Schofer, J. L., Ushpiz, A., Pedestrian flow and level of service, Journal of
Transportation Engineering 109 (1983) 46–56.
90. Fruin, J. J., Designing for pedestrians: A level-of-service concept, Highway Research
Record 355 (1971) 1–15.
91. M. Moussa¨ıd, N. Perozo, S. Garnier, D. Helbing, and G. Theraulaz (2010) The walking
behaviour of pedestrian social groups and its impact on crowd dynamics. PLoS One
5(4), e10047.
92. For a photograph of the triangular fences see http://loveparade2010doku.files.
wordpress.com/2010/07/googlemaps_bauzaeune_rampe.jpg.
93. Foodstand on the ramp, see http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=BhFoNb_lsO4 and
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dP-5VOCU30U
94. Obstacles on the ramp and change of police shifts, see http://live.loveparade.com/
fkxt76kdrf887t/videos/chronologie/hires/06_01.mp4,
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=AN_8zwycDY0
95. Visitor forecast of Lopavent from July 8, 2010, see
http://loveparade2010doku.files.wordpress.com/2011/08/bewegungsmodell.jpg,
http://loveparade2010doku.files.wordpress.com/2011/08/bewegungsmodell.pdf,
and Ref. [49].
96. Interview with the organizer of the Love Parade, see http://www.youtube.com/watch?
v=wsIvv6GQVkg
97. Estimated inflows and outflows based on videos of surveillance camera 13 are provided
at http://loveparade2010doku.wordpress.com/2011/08/06/bewegungsmodell/
98. The operation of the access points (isolating devices) can been seen in this video:
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=DTbJ_vbT8Cw The video also mentions communica-
tion problems and that the emergency units were not prepared for such a disaster.
99. Aerial photographs of the Love Parade in Duisburg, see http://www.aerophoto.de/
album.php?id=20100724%2018%201%20Loveparade_2010&language=0
100. Video of the crowd on the festival area, see http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=
bd81KIpuVc8 and the recordings of surveillance camera 4 [68].
101. G. K. Still, Duisburg - 24th July 2010, Love Parade Incident, see http://www.
derwesten-recherche.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/02/Still-Gutachten.pdf
102. Fruin, J. J., Designing for pedestrians: A level-of-service concept, Highway Research
Record 355 (1971) 1–15.
103. Surveillance videos of the ramp can be seen at http://live.loveparade.
com/fkxt76kdrf887t/videos/kameras/kamera13/hires/Kamera13_1400_1420.mp4
http://live.loveparade.com/fkxt76kdrf887t/videos/kameras/kamera13/hires/
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Kamera13_1420_1440.mp4, http://live.loveparade.com/fkxt76kdrf887t/videos/
kameras/kamera13/hires/Kamera13_1440_1500.mp4, http://live.loveparade.
com/fkxt76kdrf887t/videos/kameras/kamera13/hires/Kamera13_1500_1520.mp4,
http://live.loveparade.com/fkxt76kdrf887t/videos/kameras/kamera13/hires/
Kamera13_1520_1540.mp4, http://live.loveparade.com/fkxt76kdrf887t/videos/
kameras/kamera13/hires/Kamera13_1540_1600.mp4, http://live.loveparade.
com/fkxt76kdrf887t/videos/kameras/kamera13/hires/Kamera13_1600_1620.mp4,
http://live.loveparade.com/fkxt76kdrf887t/videos/kameras/kamera13/hires/
Kamera13_1620_1640.mp4.
104. D. Helbing (2001) Traffic and related self-driven many-particle systems. Reviews of
Modern Physics 73, 1067-1141.
105. Change in police shift, see http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=YGPrzaxsD7I&list=
UUlmsa1MvDRyVXsvCld8LMzQ&index=2&feature=plcp
106. Police cordon in the Western tunnel, see http://www.youtube.com/watch?
v=B-YX7tvcVYw, http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=e_exvp1NMjw, and http://www.
youtube.com/watch?v=jXcTJfmS7RQ.
107. Formation of police cordon 3 in the middle of the ramp, see http://www.youtube.com/
watch?v=W5BOam3eGxA and http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=joBsBYcGVsw
108. Queues are forming on both sides of the narrowing created by triangular fences on the
ramp, when police forces start to control in- and outflows, thereby creating a bottle-
neck, see http://live.loveparade.com/fkxt76kdrf887t/videos/kameras/kamera13/
hires/Kamera13_1600_1620.mp4, http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=W5BOam3eGxA,
and http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=joBsBYcGVsw.
109. The second police cordon in the Eastern tunnel opens up, see http:
//www.youtube.com/watch?v=SGx1hsOmm_M and http://live.loveparade.com/
fkxt76kdrf887t/videos/kameras/kamera16/hires/Kamera16_1600_1620.mp4
110. First visitors are entering the festival area via the narrow staircase, see http:
//www.youtube.com/watch?v=KaDoWMAZYyo and http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-
CEnjxQBmf4
111. Security people prevent a flow of people on the staircase, see http://www.youtube.
com/watch?v=lFxyl9OaqHk
112. The first police cordon in the Western tunnel opens up, see http://live.loveparade.
com/fkxt76kdrf887t/videos/kameras/kamera15/hires/Kamera15_1620_1640.mp4
113. First people are climbing the pole, see http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=
VDOlXcobbJM, http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MvlzywaFnmc, http://www.youtube.
com/watch?v=6SXgp3VlM88
114. The third police cordon dissolves, see http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_PQqBePT6ig
and http://live.loveparade.com/fkxt76kdrf887t/videos/kameras/kamera13/
hires/Kamera13_1620_1640.mp4
115. Visitors are using the small staircase to get up to the festival areas, see http://www.
youtube.com/watch?v=so6-7Ezeo3U
116. Someone has climbed a traffic sign, see http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=so6-
7Ezeo3U#t=2m41s
117. A fourth police cordon is formed in the upper area of the ramp, see
http://live.loveparade.com/fkxt76kdrf887t/videos/kameras/6ersplit/hires/
6erSplit_HiRes_1620_1640.mp4
118. Crowd shouting “Die Mauer muss weg!” [“We must get rid of the wall (cordon)!”], see
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Opd0rZVsspQ
119. Jamming on the upper part of the ramp, where visitors try to enter the festival
area, see http://live.loveparade.com/fkxt76kdrf887t/videos/kameras/kamera12/
hires/Kamera12_1400_1420.mp4
and
http://live.loveparade.com/fkxt76kdrf887t/videos/kameras/kamera13/hires/
Kamera13_1400_1420.mp4
120. Visitors climb the slopes to reach the festival area from the ramp, see
http://live.loveparade.com/fkxt76kdrf887t/videos/kameras/kamera12/hires/
Kamera12_1520_1540.mp4
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121. According to the YouTube description, a policeman says: “The venue is full.”, and
people overcome fences to get to the festival area from the tunnel, see http://
www.youtube.com/watch?v=kOjjW7Jp_Uw and http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=jm-
ScKTV6nw
122. Flow on staircase, see http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=VDOlXcobbJM#t=4m50s
123. People scream for their lives, see http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=y_agoPlP_dA#t=
4m22s
124. A bent traffic sign can be seen here: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=VDOlXcobbJM;
later on, it disappeared below the crowd, see http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=
rzz5geLWPV4
125. People shout that others should move on more quickly, see http://www.youtube.com/
watch?v=t3nDQti-zDY and http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=t3nDQti-zDY.
126. Signs of crowd turbulence around the pole, see http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=
h3ik6n2BPa8
127. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=UWXXDEZ4oKg
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=YmQR6kgwSxA
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=r1toPUusRGU
128. An unconscious woman is carried over the crowd towards the staircase, see http:
//www.youtube.com/watch?v=KbvDLmQTED8
129. Slowly moving crowd in the tunnel, see http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=
CPcH4zZtY7w
130. Loud speaker announcement stating “The venue is full.”, see http://www.youtube.
com/watch?v=Y85nUacO2GU
131. Problems between staircase and tunnel, see http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=
8aTXT3ht8VU
132. Many people raising their hands, hoping for help (visible in full screen mode), see
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1lHLIn78650
133. An emergency vehicle enters the ramp, see http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=
XKo3rb5R_Dc
134. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0VEbvBMrAG8
135. A few people crawl on top of others, see http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xxd_
KlaCiNY
136. Videos showing people crawling or walking on others, see http://www.youtube.com/
watch?v=JPIn5DPInB4, http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=y_agoPlP_dA, and http://
www.youtube.com/watch?v=OfQjXi3J3ns
137. People climb up from the container in the South, see
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2B5o2wgdHcw
138. Loveparade 2010 Disaster FullHD.mp4 16:54 - 17:03, see http://www.youtube.com/
watch?v=OfQjXi3J3ns
139. People are pulled up from the container, see http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=
IoxPIvrFCNg
140. A woman screams for her life, see http://www.youtube.com/verify_age?next_url=
/watch%3Fv%3D3x00DBo4gb8
141. Many people yell for help, see http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=YxIZwvvhpp8
142. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=t3_3UIZS3dw
143. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Kc8wEMiOxoo
144. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=BbCrmUZeJoY
145. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=NLC3vyp0b9U
146. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=OgJYkNDiDCY
147. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=gN4NNmxtRU4
148. http://www.youtube.com/verify_age?next_url=/watch%3Fv%3Ds2ywRwxfHbo
149. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=QcAVAYDolKc
150. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JfaLr_Y4U18
151. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-iCA6g984aY
152. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=LXLuoqNDJ-A
153. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=FYXQLgd_VA8
154. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Nb0m_n0KGms
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155. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-7WDbM4EonY
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=zCRGtjcbyw8
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=gEa9_k-Th7U
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_CiEkTPk9BQ
156. Operation room of the city of Duisburg considers the Love Parade as success as late as
17:15, see http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=S9ILNAv0J1A and http://www.youtube.
com/watch?v=FHD8aqsCr9U
157. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qQbto4MNqOU
158. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=WR56iEfBQoo
159. Videos of the continuation of the Love Parade after the Crowd Disaster, see http:
//www.youtube.com/watch?v=Dz8dID-xTBo
160. RTL documentation, see http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=fy1NDX_nA3M
161. Falling from staircase as assumed cause of the crowd disaster, see:
http://www.n-tv.de/panorama/Loveparade-endet-im-Unglueck-18-Menschen-
sterben-article1127116.html, http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=IreaH16lm_c,
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Dz8dID-xTBo
162. Mass panic (stampede) as assumed cause of the crowd disaster, see:
http://www.focus.de/panorama/welt/loveparade-mindestens-15-tote-nach-
massenpanik_aid_533916.html
http://www.welt.de/die-welt/politik/article8627956/15-Tote-bei-der-Love-
Parade.html
http://www.videoportal.sf.tv/video?id=b5b05584-57b7-42fe-bbb3-5c28d96ff6aa
163. Wrong behavior of people assumed as reason for the crowd disaster: http:
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